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I. INTRODUCTION
Social norms scholarship faces the challenge of becoming a ma-
ture discipline. Norms theorists have proposed several elegant,
widely applicable theories of the origin, evolution and function of
norms.1 For the most part, these theories have suggested that social
norms can be viewed as a refinement to the behavioral assumptions
of rational choice theory. 2 Although this approach at least implic-
itly suggests that accounting for norms will improve the predictive
capacity of rational choice models, the work must overcome sub-
stantial hurdles if it is to do so. The wide range of norms and mech-
anisms of norm influence on behavior complicate the 'formal
modeling process, and the divergent terms and theoretical con-
structs used by the academic disciplines that seek to understand
norms present additional challenges. For norms scholarship to
flourish, norms theories must be applied to real-world problems in
ways that do notjust complicate the analysis but advance our ability
to predict the effects of laws on behavior and, ultimately, to assist
policymakers.3
1. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Dis-
PuTEs (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMs (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Structural
Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 215 (1994); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997).
2. Robert Ellickson has framed the core issue surrounding social norms to be
whether the norms scholarship represents a Kuhnian paradigm shift, or simply the refine-
ment or filling in of lacunae in law and economics. Ellickson has suggested that the norms
scholarship represents the latter. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); see also Richard McAdams, Comment, Accounting for
Norms, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 625, 626-30 (1997). Not all norms theorists take the narrower
view. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181,
2181 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson,
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This article takes the next step in the evolution of norms schol-
arship. The article does not purport to offer an elegant or universal
theory of norms, but rather to improve the predictive capacity of
rational choice theory in a specific setting: the environmental com-
pliance decision-making of corporate managers. In particular, the
article draws on existing empirical literature to propose a concep-
tual framework that accounts for the influence of norms on envi-
ronmental decision-making.4 The proposed framework not only
serves as a research agenda for scholars applying norms theory to
corporate environmental compliance, but it also has implications
for research on compliance with a number of other regulatory re-
gimes, including tax, worker health and safety, securities and
health care.5
The stakes are high. The overall effects of corporate environ-
mental noncompliance on human health and environmental qual-
ity are poorly understood, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the
effects are substantial. 6 For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has reported that more than 6.8 billion pounds of
pollutants were reduced as a result of enforcement actions con-
cluded in fiscal year 1999.' The effects of noncompliance range
from ecosystem damage in the rivers of the Pacific Northwest to
human health problems from poor air quality in the Northeast.
The financial implications of corporate environmental compliance
65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 57, 62 (1989); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law
and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1603 (2000).
4. The approach taken in this article is that suggested by advocates of a new para-
digm, "law and behavioral science." These advocates assert that if behavioral factors that
complicate rational choice theory are to improve the predictive capacity of existing models
and provide policy-relevant recommendations, researchers will need to refine broad theo-
ries and test the refinements in particularized settings. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000). For a recent example of empirical work in a
particularized area of legal scholarship, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
5. Enforcement strategies are often similar across many regulatory agencies. For ex-
ample, early in the current Bush Administration both the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a more coopera-
tive enforcement approach. Compare Whitman Aims to Boost Upfront Compliance, Avoid Enforce-
ment, INSIDE EPA, June 15, 2001, at 3, with Floyd Norris, Harvey Pitt's S.E.C.: From Guard Dog
to Friendly Puppy?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at C1 (noting that the SEC "used a minor
enforcement action to herald a policy of not cracking down on companies that come for-
ward to report their own errors").
6. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE As-
SURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1999 3 (2000).
7. Id. at 4. Of course, it is likely that many additional pounds of pollutants went unde-
tected. Id.
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also are substantial. The cost of EPA's enforcement program ex-
ceeds $400 million per year, and the states spend comparable
amounts.' Similarly, estimates of the total annual cost of corporate
environmental compliance exceed $100 billion.9 Small changes in
compliance rates, therefore, may have large effects on human
health, environmental quality and the costs of compliance.
The stakes are also high for norms theory. If norms scholars do
not demonstrate that norms theory adds to the predictive capacity
of rational choice models, the impact on policymakers will be neg-
ligible and the importance of norms theory will fade over time.
The conceptual framework presented in this article suggests reason
for optimism: norms can be added to a rational choice approach to
corporate environmental decision-making in ways that will assist
policymakers and that will allow norms theories to be tested and
refined.
If a norms theory is to add to the predictive capacity of rational
choice models and contribute meaningfully to policy debates, it
must identify the norms that have the greatest influence on the
relevant behavior and explain their influence. Hence, at the heart
of the proposed conceptual framework is a typology of eight norms
that are likely to influence the environmental compliance decision-
making of corporate managers. A review of the legal norms litera-
ture and empirical studies on environmental and other types of
regulatory compliance suggests that the eight norms of law compli-
ance, human health protection, environmental protection, auton-
omy, fair process, good faith, reciprocity and conformity are the
most likely to influence corporate environmental managers.'0 The
existence of each of these norms is supported by empirical studies,
even though several have not yet been discussed by legal norms
scholars.
Empirical research suggests that law and law enforcement can
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 107-159, at57 (2001); H.R. REP. No. 107-272, at 131 (2001)
(indicating the initial House appropriation approval and increases in conference commit-
tee); see also Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound
Policies for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 FoRiaDAM ErVTL. L.J. 583, 622 n.124 (1996)
(discussing the funding of EPA enforcement). States conduct roughly 80% of all civil envi-
ronmental enforcement. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States
Battle for the Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,803,
10,805 (2000) [hereinafter EPA and the States].
9. See Paul R. Portney, Introduction, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION 2 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990); GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH BUSINESS INCENTIVES 26 (1999).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 68-218.
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affect many norms simultaneously and that subtle shifts in govern-
ment actions can have substantial effects on managers' intentions
to comply in regulated firms. As a result, the focus here is not on
an extended evaluation of any one norm, but on setting forth a
typology of the most influential norms and examining how their
interactions may influence compliance decision-making. Identify-
ing a set of norms will inevitably raise concerns about the precise
definition of the norms and why any one norm is included or ex-
cluded from the typology. Some will note that influential norms
are excluded. Others will argue that one or more of the norms
included is not influential or is not an independent variable. Al-
though these are genuine concerns, examining one norm in isola-
tion may also skew the analysis. An approach that focuses on one
norm or one effect of law on norms may ignore other, counter-
vailing, influences. An approach that does not offer a comprehen-
sive account of the most influential norms or the complex
interactions of law and norms will have limited predictive capacity
and will leave policymakers with little more insight than they al-
ready possess by virtue of common intuition.
When viewed together, the eight norms included in the pro-
posed conceptual framework suggest a number of important impli-
cations for environmental law and enforcement. Opportunities to
increase compliance at low cost are being missed, and a number of
policies that are designed to deter, persuade or build capacity may
have counterproductive effects on compliance rates. For example,
an opportunity to enhance compliance may be missed when agen-
cies only report the size of the penalty and the amount of pollu-
tants prevented by an enforcement action. The norms analysis
suggests that greater increases in compliance rates may result from
describing the harms to human health and the environment that
were likely avoided through the enforcement action, rather than
just reporting the size of the sanction or the amount of pollution
prevented.
In addition, counterproductive norm effects may arise from the
common federal environmental enforcement strategy of bundling
enforcement actions of a particular type into a widely publicized
national initiative. The objective is plausible: to create national me-
dia attention that will deter other potential violators. Yet the norm
of conformity suggests that unless the message conveyed in these
national initiatives is carefully crafted, the initiatives may instead
60 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
create a perception of widespread noncompliance in regulated
firms, which could lead to less compliance.
In addition to setting forth a testable framework, this article
contributes to the norms literature on the mechanisms of action by
which law and law enforcement trigger norms. Most notably, the
theory of norm activation, which has been studied extensively by
social psychologists,11 provides an important additional mecha-
nism, yet it has been overlooked in the legal literature. The article
includes norm activation in the proposed framework and suggests
that it may be valuable in other areas of interest to norms scholars.
In addition, the article concludes that several of the other trigger-
ing mechanisms proposed in the legal norms literature are suffi-
ciently supported by empirical studies to be included in the
proposed framework of environmental compliance decision-
making.
Parts II and III of the article draw upon the empirical literature
to outline a conceptual framework of the role that norms play in
the environmental decision-making of corporate managers. Part II
identifies the mechanisms by which the norms included in the ty-
pology may influence compliance decision-making. Part III pro-
poses a typology of specific norms that are most likely to influence
corporate environmental compliance. For each norm, the article
discusses the scope of the norm, the ways in which the norm may
influence behavior, and potential implications for environmental
law and enforcement policy.
Part IV then examines the extent to which the proposed frame-
work may improve the predictive capacity of the standard deter-
rence model. The deterrence model applies rational choice theory
to corporate environmental compliance and concludes that in-
creasing the certainty and severity of penalties will deter noncom-
pliance. 2 In the academic literature and policy debates, an
alternative "cooperation model" has been proposed, in large part
as a reaction to the adversarial enforcement methods suggested by
the deterrence model. 3 Legal analysts on both sides of the envi-
11. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1215 (1998).
13. See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 917 (2001) (pointing out that
for corporations that choose to cooperate, but are unable to do so due to the complexity of
environmental requirements, aggressive enforcement actions may undermine compliance
rates); see also IAN AYRES &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
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ronmental enforcement debate have called for consideration of a
broader set of factors in the standard deterrence model, yet no one
has proposed a construct for doing so.' 4 Accordingly, Part IV re-
views the empirical literature on corporate environmental compli-
ance. It concludes that including norms in a rational choice theory
of environmental compliance will provide such a construct and will
improve the ability of the deterrence model to predict several as-
pects of observed compliance. For example, the standard deter-
rence model does not explain why increases in monitoring appear
to lead to increases in compliance, but increases in the severity of
the sanction often do not. 5 Norms that enhance or subvert the
deterrent effect of enforcement actions may be at work in that
case. Norms also may explain the existence of a tipping point ap-
parent when formal legal deterrence falls below a certain level.
Part V concludes that the proposed framework will advance the
debate concerning the appropriate mix of environmental enforce-
ment actions by allowing normal science to be conducted on the
influence of norms on environmental compliance. 6 The results of
this research may help resolve many of the positive questions con-
cerning the effects of environmental enforcement on compliance.
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforce-
ment, 6 LAW & POL'Y 385 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental
Monitoring and Enforcement, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,245, 10,245 (2000) (discuss-
ing the importance of incorporating norms into the standard deterrence model); Daniel
A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental
Law, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 297, 320-21 (1999) (explaining the importance of including
the insights from social norms research into policies designed to increase environmental
compliance); Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALEJ.
ON REG. 535, 545 (1996) (noting the need for developing cooperative strategies); Recht-
schaffen, supra note 12, at 1186 (suggesting regulators "should move to a system of envi-
ronmental enforcement that is grounded in deterrence theory but integrates the most
constructive features of a cooperative model"); Spence, supra note 13, at 978 (suggesting
that the effects of complexity should be taken into account in environmental
enforcement).
15. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,245; see also Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E.
Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 328-29 (1980).
16. See THoMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5 (3d ed. 1996)
(describing the conditions under which "normal science" can be conducted). Kuhn pro-
posed that standard research activity is effective in part because it is narrowly focused on
the ."conceptual boxes" provided by the scientists' training. This "normal science" is con-
ducted within the prevailing conceptual boxes or paradigms until anomalies in research
results lead to the development of new paradigms. Kuhn described these paradigm shifts as
scientific revolutions and suggested that scientific revolutions end with the acceptance of a
new paradigm and the commencement of a new period of normal science. See id. at 5-6.
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The approach also may ferret out a number of responses to en-
forcement that are counterintuitive when viewed in light of the
standard deterrence model, yet that suggest needed changes to
current enforcement policy and statutory tools. In the long run,
the research is likely to conclude that compliance will be furthered
not simply by a shift toward greater use of formal deterrence or
alternative techniques, but by carefully tailoring enforcement to
enhance the compliance generated through both formal and infor-
mal sanctions. Such research also may help resolve more general
disagreements in the legal literature about the nature and function
of norms.
II. LAW, NoRms AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
It is possible to develop a broad conceptual framework that re-
flects insights from the ostensibly divergent literatures of law and
economics, sociology and social psychology.' 7 This Part draws upon
those literatures to identify the means by which environmental law
and law enforcement influence norms, and the means by which
norms influence the environmental compliance decision-making
of corporate managers. Wherever possible, I use terms that bridge
the concepts used in the legal and social science literatures. Part III
then proposes a typology of the specific norms that influence this
decision-making. Together, Parts II and III present a conceptual
framework for including norms in a rational choice theory of envi-
ronmental compliance.
The article's assumptions should be clarified at the outset.
Economists, environmentalists and others differ on whether gov-
ernment should seek to achieve optimal compliance, full compli-
ance or excess compliance by firms. Rationales can be advanced
for each of these positions. The approach utilized here does not
presume that agencies should seek to achieve any particular level
of compliance and does not seek to identify a desired level of com-
pliance. Instead, it recognizes that environmental agencies have
limited enforcement resources and asks how agencies can best
manage those resources to achieve the desired levels of
compliance.
In addition, many scholars examine corporate compliance from
the perspective of corporate governance. According to the agency
17. For a discussion of the limited impact of sociological research on the develop-
ment of policy in the criminal law field, see Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology:
The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MicH. L. REv. 2477 (1997).
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theory of the firm, a firm complies with legal requirements because
the individuals in the firm respond to incentives created by the
firm and outside actors. From this perspective, the issues include:
(1) what compliance levels are optimal for the firm; (2) how the
firm distributes decision-making authority to achieve those compli-
ance levels; (3) how it fills the positions that have such authority;
and (4) how it creates incentives to ensure that the decisions made
by corporate managers serve the interests of the firm. This perspec-
tive leads to the view that decisions to comply with the law that are
optimal for the individual but suboptimal for the firm represent a
problem in firm governance. Although these are fascinating and
important issues, this article takes a different approach. The article
assumes that individual managers have been given management
decision-making authority and examines how they exercise that au-
thority. Ultimately, this work will inform efforts to identify how
firms can more efficiently align the interests of principals and
agents. But, before we can fully address the corporate governance
issues, we should better understand how managers respond to a
wide range of incentives, whether created directly by laws and en-
forcement policies or by the responses of firms to those laws and
policies."1
A. Adding Norms to the Standard Deterrence Model
1. The standard deterrence model.
Rational choice theories dominate models of environmental
enforcement and compliance. In particular, the standard eco-
nomic deterrence model has applied a rational choice analysis to
environmental compliance decision-making. 9 Common formula-
18. The framework set forth in this article seeks to explain individuals' intentions to
comply, rather than the behavior of firms. Yet the distinction may not be significant for
many firms: in many small firms, for example, principal-agent issues do not arise. Studies
of individuals in larger firms where the distinction is significant suggest that the costs and
benefits that are most salient to decision-makers are those that affect them personally,
rather than those that affect the firm as a whole. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson,
A Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime, in CRIMES OF PRIVILEGE: READINGS IN WHITE COL-
LAR CRIME 194, 197 (Neal Shover & John P. Wright eds., 2001). Interestingly, research
suggests that when individual environmental managers are afforded higher levels of discre-
tion, the firm as a whole is more likely to interpret environmental issues as opportunities
rather than threats. Firms that have adopted such an opportunity-oriented view have re-
ported higher levels of regulatory compliance and improved environmental performance.
See Sanjay Sharma, Managerial Interpretations and Organizational Context as Predictors of Corpo-
rate Choice of Environmental Strategy, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 681, 691 (2000).
19. The standard deterrence model has its origins in economic theory. Gary Becker's
1968 article has been particularly influential. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
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tions of the standard deterrence model assume that an individual
will seek to maximize expected utility and thus will comply with an
environmental law when the costs of noncompliance exceed the
benefits. The costs of noncompliance are assumed to be the prod-
uct of the certainty and severity of formal legal sanctions. Following
this approach, individuals are not motivated to comply absent the
threat of formal legal sanctions.
Thus, it is not surprising that deterrence has been the principal
rationale for federal environmental enforcement for over two de-
cades. Indeed, examples of deterrence model prescriptions
abound in federal environmental laws, enforcement policies and
strategies.2 0 The deterrence model suggests that the government
can improve corporate compliance by increasing monitoring, de-
creasing the standards necessary for imposing legal sanctions, or
increasing the magnitude of the sanctions. Increased monitoring is
commonly believed to be the most expensive of the three options
to the government.2" Nevertheless, monitoring frequency and rigor
are commonly used as indicators of the success of deterrence-based
environmental enforcement programs, and deterrence advocates
point to the need to increase inspections and other monitoring
activities.2" Following the deterrence model, inspections are ori-
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Becker developed a model of optimal
criminal penalties that has been applied to both criminal and civil regulatory enforcement.
For an overview of the economic literature regarding environmental enforcement and
compliance, see Mark A. Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, in 3
INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 44 (Henk Folmer
& Tom Tietenberg eds., 1999); Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,245-50.
20. See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1186; EPA and the States, supra note 8, at
10,803; Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 196 (1998) (urging EPA to "recon-
sider the utility of enforcement as a negative incentive that could attract industry partici-
pants more effectively and quickly than any other"); see alsoJOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT
AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 102-03 (1995);James A. Lofton, Environmen-
tal Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values and Attitudes on Social Regulation, 31 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,906, 10,911 (2001) (suggesting that differences between environ-
mental values in the United States and the United Kingdom indicate American businesses
will not comply in the absence of a strong deterrence-based enforcement program); Joel A.
Mintz, Rebuttal: EPA Enforcement and the Challenge of Change, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,538, 10,540 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,251 (concluding that the costs of increased
environmental monitoring may outweigh the increased deterrent effect); Dan M. Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 377-78 (1997) (noting the
high cost of criminal law monitoring).
22. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, PRIME SUSPECrs: THE LAw-BREAKING
POLLUTERS AMERICA FAILS TO INSPECT 3 (2000) (calling inspection "the core of any good
enforcement program" and criticizing states for failing to inspect regulated entities), avail-
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ented toward detecting violations and collecting evidence for en-
forcement actions, rather than providing compliance advice. Given
the expense of increasing government monitoring, deterrence ad-
vocates often focus on changes in environmental laws that increase
the likelihood of conviction or the severity of the sanction.23
The formal enforcement policies and informal enforcement
strategies of EPA and the Department of Justice also reflect the
influence of the deterrence model. EPA's civil penalty policies
identify specific and general deterrence as central goals and em-
phasize the importance of legal sanctions in achieving both.24 Sev-
eral common enforcement strategies also reflect the influence of
the deterrence model. For example, top officials often seek to con-
vey a deterrence message by making public pronouncements at in-
dustry conferences, in the trade press and in the national media.
As stated by a former EPA Assistant Administrator, the federal en-
forcement philosophy is that polluters must know that if they fall
off the path of compliance, "the bear is hungry."25 Similarly, EPA
and the Department of Justice seek to achieve specific and general
deterrence through the strategies they use to conduct and publi-
cize specific enforcement actions. One common strategy attempts
able at http://www.ewg.org/pub/home/reports/primesuspects/index.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2002).
23. In keeping with that approach, Congress increased the federal criminal sanctions
for many environmental violations between 1980 and 1990. See generally RichardJ. Lazarus,
Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmen-
tal Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995). The intent to deter noncompliance through
increased criminal and civil penalties is discussed in the legislative history of the 1987
amendments to the Clean Water Act. See H.R. REP. No. 99-1004, at 138 (1986); S. REP. No.
99-50, at 29 (1985).
24. The policies require the recovery of the economic benefit of noncompliance,
plus an additional "gravity" component based on the harm caused by the violation and the
challenge presented by the violation to the regulatory framework. (For example, failing to
apply for a permit may not cause harm but may threaten the regulatory system.) The inclu-
sion of a gravity component is designed to ensure that "the violator is economically worse
off than if it had obeyed the law." U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties, 17 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,083, 35,083 (1984). EPA defines "economic benefit" to include
benefits from delays in pollution control expenditures, from avoiding them altogether,
and from the competitive advantage gained from the noncompliance. See id. The policy
states that "the penalty's size will tend to deter other potential violators." Id. EPA's policy
on referral of criminal matters to the Department of Justice for prosecution and the De-
partment of Justice policy on criminal environmental prosecutions also reflect a deter-
rence-based approach. For a review of EPA enforcement initiatives, see David L. Markell,
The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide
Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 1, 14-27 (2000).
25. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1185 n.12 (quoting James M. Strock, EPA's
Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327, 10,332
(1990)).
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to enhance the general deterrent effect of enforcement actions by
consolidating individual enforcement cases into major national ac-
tions against polluters with common patterns of violations. 26 The
EPA Administrator and the Attorney General have used joint an-
nouncements of these major national actions to generate wide-
spread media attention.27
As noted above, the deterrence model also influences evalua-
tions of agency performance. 28 If increased deterrence-based en-
forcement activity leads to increased compliance rates, as predicted
by the deterrence model, then counting the activity levels of en-
forcement agencies (e.g., inspections conducted, administrative or-
ders issued, cases filed and penalties assessed) is an obvious way to
measure their success. 29 Activity counts are often referred to as
"beans" in the enforcement community, and they are the historical
yardsticks for measuring environmental enforcement effective-
ness." Although bean counting is not a necessary prescriptio'n of
the deterrence-based approach, that approach's prediction that in-
creasing enforcement monitoring and sanctioning will increase
compliance buttresses the focus on activity counts.
26. For example, in the fall of 1999 EPA announced the simultaneous filing of eight
lawsuits alleging violations of the Clean Air Act's New Source Review provisions. See Kevin
A. Gaynor & Benjamin S. Lippard, Environmental Enforcement: Industry Should Not Be Compla-
cent, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,488, 10,489 (2002). See also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER ENFORCEMENT: STATE ENFORCEMENT OF CLEAN
WATER ACT DISCHARGES CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE 50 (2001) (noting that "[s] tates can gain
an additional deterrent effect by publicizing their enforcement responses widely, using
vehicles such as state websites and press releases"). This is not a new phenomenon, but
rather has been a strategic choice since the 1970s. See PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW:
THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 146 (1991) (noting EPA's use of press
conferences to announce enforcement actions in the early 1970s).
27. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Attorney General Reno, EPA Ad-
ministrator Browner to Announce Unprecedented Enforcement Action (Nov. 3, 1999) (on
file with author).
28. See, e.g., KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE
SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION 5-6 (1984) (noting that sanctioning systems lead to "sta-
tistics of process" whereas compliance systems lead to "statistics of impact"); Milo Mason,
Snapshot Interview: Steven A. Herman, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 286, 286-87 (1998) (attrib-
uting to Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, the view that the extent of
the deterrent effect does vary with the number of inspections and enforcement actions and
the magnitude of penalties).
29. See Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, 12 ENVrL. F. 19, 19-20 (1995). Stahl
was EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance when
he wrote this article.
30. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1219.
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2. The alternative conceptual framework.
The alternative conceptual framework presented here departs
from the standard deterrence model in two important respects.
First, it accounts for social norm sanctions in addition to formal
legal sanctions. Second, although it proposes a structure for evalu-
ating the impacts of formal legal sanctions and informal social
norms, it does not suggest that environmental compliance deci-
sion-making involves simply adding or multiplying the relevant fac-
tors. Studies of environmental compliance decision-making have
not yet established precisely how these factors influence compli-
ance decisions. That does not suggest, however, that norm effects
should be ignored or relegated to a more peripheral consideration
after determining the economic costs and benefits of formal legal
sanctions. After a discussion of the types of social norms included
in the framework, Parts II.B and II.C address how norms may influ-
ence the environmental compliance decision-making process of
corporate managers.
In the framework presented here, individuals are presumed to
be rational actors seeking to maximize their subjective expected
utility. Perceived costs and benefits influence the behavioral inten-
tions of the individual. Formal legal sanctions are one such per-
ceived cost. In these respects, the framework is consistent with the
standard deterrence model. Yet the framework presented here de-
parts from the standard deterrence model by including perceived
costs of external and internal norms in the environmental compli-
ance decision-making process. 1 The perceived costs of external
norms arise from the individual's expectations that external social
sanctions will be imposed if others learn of the violation of the
norm.3 2 The perceived costs of internal norms arise from the indi-
31. For a critique of methodologically thin rational choice theories, see W. Bradley
Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explana-
tion, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 3940 (2002). For a model of individual and firm criminal compliance
that explicitly incorporates norm effects into the standard deterrence model, see Mark A.
Cohen & Sally S. Simpson, The Origins of Corporate Criminality: Rational Individual and Orga-
nizational Actors, in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 33 (William S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997).
Cohen and Simpson's model incorporates variables to account for the self-respect and rep-
utation of the individual, but it does not suggest the mechanisms by which law enforce-
ment will affect these variables. Id.
32. I define a norm to be an informal obligation that can be internally or externally
enforced. Patterns of behavior do not constitute norms in and of themselves, but individu-
als may ascribe norms to observed patterns. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 218 (explaining
that many sociologists refer to a norm as a regularity or pattern of behavior, whereas many
economists, philosophers and lawyers refer to a norm as a perception about what people
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vidual's expectations regarding the guilt or shame that will be felt
upon violation of the norm.
This inclusion of internal and external norm sanctions as addi-
tional costs is consistent with a leading, early sociological theory on
the ways in which law may affect behavior. The theory, outlined in
a 1961 article by Dennis Wrong, led sociologists to examine three
factors that may inhibit noncompliance: (1) fear of formal legal
sanctions; (2) fear of informal social sanctions; and (3) internaliza-
tion of legal norms or moral commitment to comply with the law.
33
A leading study of law compliance concluded that these three re-
present "a concise and probably exhaustive set" of the factors that
inhibit noncompliance.34 The first factor, fear of formal legal sanc-
tions, refers to the costs commonly included in the standard deter-
rence model. The second factor, the fear of informal sanctions, is
simply the fear of external norm sanctions. The third factor, moral
commitment to comply with the law, is an internal norm.
Although experts in various fields often use differing terminol-
ogies, the distinctions between internal and external norms are
found in the legal, sociological and social psychological litera-
tures." In the legal literature, Robert Cooter has maintained that
"ought" to do). Social norms are enforced through informal sanctions, as opposed to other
patterns of behavior, which are not enforced through informal sanctions. In the norm
typology presented in this article, the norm of conformity provides an example of the
relationship between a pattern of behavior and a norm. The non-norm patterns of behav-
ior discussed in the legal literature include coordination and epistemic customs. Steven
Hetcher has explained that coordination customs are utility maximizing for the individual
in the absence of enforcement and thus are self-enforcing. See Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe
Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1999). For a discussion of epistemic
customs, see infra note 198.
33. See, e.g., Grasmick & Green, supra note 15, at 334 (citing Dennis Wrong, The Over-
socialized View of Man in Sociology, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 183, 186-88 (1961)).
34. See id.
35. The terms that other researchers have used to refer to external norms include
"social norms" and "subjective norms." See, e.g., Paul C. Stern et al., A Value-Belief-Norm
Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism, 6 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 81,
85 (1999). Terms that have been used for internal norms include "moral commitment,"
"moral norms" and "personal norms." See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 2, at 626-30. Other
important terms used in the social psychology and sociology literature that relate to norms
are "values," "beliefs" and "attitudes." In this article, I treat beliefs as views about the empir-
ical state of the world, such as "that factory emits ten tons of carbon monoxide a year."
Beliefs do not constitute norms, but they may affect individuals' interpretation or imple-
mentation of norms. I treat values as roughly synonymous with abstract norms. An example
might be "protection of the environment is good." Finally, I view general attitudes as being
roughly synonymous with abstract norms; and I treat specific attitudes as concrete norms
where there is a normative judgment involved and as beliefs where there is not. Attitudes
can vary in their level of specificity; thus one could regard as attitudes both "factories that
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an internal norm may arise when an individual internalizes a strat-
egy or pattern of behavior as an obligation. 6 Internal norms also
may be inculcated through contacts with family, friends, educa-
tional and religious groups, or other organizations. Internal
norms are enforced through feelings of guilt, anxiety, loss of self-
esteem and other related emotions.3 8 A number of legal scholars
have noted that internal norms may be valuable in explaining activ-
ities such as some forms of charity, tipping at roadside restaurants,
and litter control that may otherwise be inexplicable from a narrow
view of a rational individual attempting to maximize utility. 9
The distinction between the effects of internal and external
norms may be difficult to discern. External norms are widely held
beliefs about social obligations with respect to which noncompli-
ance may trigger external social sanctions. An individual may inter-
nalize a norm that is widely shared and enforced by others,
however, and in that case the norm may function both through
internal and external sanctions. But the individual need not hold
the belief personally. Compliance with an external norm may oc-
cur because of a fear of external social sanctions even if the individ-
ual disagrees with the norm and has not internalized it." The role
violate environmental laws are bad" and "the carbon monoxide emissions of that factory
are bad." Some social psychological studies have found the influence of an attitude on
behavior increases as the attitude becomes more specific. For example, specific attitudes
about how individuals benefit from energy conservation, such as "an energy efficient home
will save money and be worth more" were better predictors of conservation behavior than
more generalized concerns about the effects of a national energy crisis. See, e.g., J. Stanley
Black et al., Personal and Contextual Influences on Household Energy Adaptations, 70 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 3, 17 (1985). My treatment of these terms may not reflect a consensus view. Yet
positing such common terminology allows theories and study results to be compared across
disciplines; and, at least at this juncture in the development of social norms theory, the
benefits of making such comparisons possible arguably outweigh the cost of losing nuances
along the way.
36. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 218; see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a
Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1643 (1996) [hereinafter Decentralized Law]; Robert D. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make
Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577 (2000).
37. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Norms as Social Capital, in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 133 (Gerald Radnetsky &
Peter Bernholz eds., 1987) (discussing types of "behavioral conditioning" of internal
norms). In sociology literature, studies of internal norms often draw on the work of Par-
sons and Durkheim. See generally TALCO-rr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951); EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (1915).
38. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 1, at 377-81.
39. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 538; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 909 (1996).
40. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998)
(distinguishing between first party and third party enforcement of norms); Decentralized
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of external social norms in closely knit groups and in society at
large has been explored by legal and social science scholars.41
Once created, external social norms may be enforced through a
variety of informal negative and positive mechanisms. Informal
negative sanctions include a variety of censuring activities, such as
gossip, stigma, shaming or ostracism. External norms are relatively
easily enforced since the transaction costs of inflicting negative gos-
sip or expressions of esteem may be very low.
4 2
Although norms theorists often emphasize the inhibitory or
negative function of norms, norms also may provide positive social
control or encouragement. The positive rewards of internal norms
include pride and increased self-esteem. Similarly, the positive re-
wards of external norms include enhanced reputation or the es-
teem of others.43 This article occasionally addresses positive
rewards, but it does not purport to give a full account of the role of
positive rewards in corporate environmental decision-making. The
literature suggests that the effects of positive rewards may be fertile
ground for future research and could provide new insights to the
framework outlined here.44
Richard McAdams has developed a theory that ties together in-
ternal and external norms by arguing that both can be explained
through the influence of esteem competition. In this view, individ-
uals hold stable, abstract norms that are internalized through pa-
Law, supra note 36, at 1667 (distinguishing between "principled conformity" with internal
norms and "adventitious conformity" with external norms).
41. Many studies have examined the role of norms in the behavior of individuals in
small groups. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF IN-
STITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (examining the role of norms in relationships
among rice farmers in Sri Lanka); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (diamond
merchants in New York); Janet T. Landa & Robert Cooter, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade:
The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INr'L REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1984) (Asian
merchants); Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (Minnesota businessmen). For analyses of the role of norms
outside a group setting, see Kahan, supra note 21, at 349-50; McAdams, supra note 1, at 407.
42. McAdams, supra note 1, at 407 (asserting that external norm sanctioning may be
costless).
43. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 540.
44. For example, Grasmick and Green have concluded that moral commitment, so-
cial disapproval and the threat of legal punishment all inhibit illegal behavior but that these
factors explain only about forty percent of the variance in behavior. Grasmick & Green,
supra note 15, at 334. They suggest that motivational factors explain the remainder of the
variance. See alsojames Alm et al., Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 311 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (sug-
gesting that "rewards may be more effective than punishments" for eliminating some types
of tax noncompliance).
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rental and other influences.4 5 Individuals value the esteem of
others, and norms espoused by others are enforced through grant-
ing or withholding esteem.4 6 McAdams has suggested that external
norms tend to be newer and more ephemeral concrete norms, as
opposed to the older and more stable abstract norms.
The conceptual framework proposed here assumes that all indi-
viduals share a set of abstract, internal norms. The relative weight-
ing of these norms may differ from person to person and from
group to group.4 7 These norms and their relative weighting may
evolve over time through various experiences, including interac-
tions with law and law enforcement. The notion that the individ-
ual's internal norms may change presents a substantial challenge
to any attempt to predict behavior.48 The proposed framework as-
45. According to McAdams, the old and stable abstract norms, such as "be a good
neighbor," are more likely to be taught to children or otherwise internalized and therefore
to survive from generation to generation. McAdams, supra note 1, at 395. More recently,
McAdams has noted that individuals may internalize norms by observing patterns of behav-
ior and intuiting normative propositions from the patterns. E-mail from Richard McAdams
to Michael P. Vandenbergh (Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
46. McAdams, supra note 1, at 383-84. The key difference between internal and exter-
nal norms, according to McAdams, is whether the norm is abstract (and therefore likely
internalized) or concrete (and therefore less likely to be internalized). Id.
47. Several studies provide empirical support for the notion that a number of values
or abstract norms are widely, if not universally, held. See, e.g., Shalom Schwartz, Universals in
the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in
25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992). The typology
proposed in this article does not require that the norms be held with equal intensity, nor
that they be defined in precisely the same way by each individual or group. For example, in
some cases survey data demonstrate differences between business managers and other sub-
populations. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Toward A Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant
Behavior, 56J. Soc. ISSUES 407, 415 (2000) (noting the existence of value orientations that
correlate to environmentally significant behaviors). To the extent empirical studies suggest
that individuals fall into coherent groups based on the types of norms they hold, regulators
can accommodate the variations among these groups by tailoring prescriptions to each
group or by evaluating which prescriptions have the greatest intended overall effect with-
out such tailoring. Ultimately, the norms of each of several subpopulations may need to be
subject to a different typology and analyzed separately, but that next level of tailoring of
the framework can be done after the initial typology of environmental compliance norms
is tested and refined. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1058 (noting the need to tailor
theories to subpopulations).
48. The norms literature includes debates about the relative influence of internal
and external norms, and about the ability of rational choice theories to account for hetero-
geneity in internal norms among different individuals or changes in norms over time
within the same individual. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 1603 n.39 (asserting that if pref-
erences or "values change and if those changes influence behavior, then the rational
choice analyst must treat those values and preferences as endogenous or else abandon any
pretense of having a fully predictive model"). Eric Posner has asserted that external norms
are valuable additions to the analysis of regulatory compliance, and tax compliance in
particular, but that internal norms are dependent variables and thus not valuable in ex-
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sumes that the set of norms is both widely held and relatively sta-
ble. Although this assumption reduces the ability of the proposed
approach to account for short-term changes in norms, long-term
changes in the types or relative weightings of norms among individ-
uals relevant to corporate environmental decision-making can be
detected with rigorous empirical testing, and the norm typology
can be adjusted periodically to account for these changes. Part III
discusses eight norms that appear to influence environmental com-
pliance the most based on currently available research. Before dis-
cussing those specific norms, however, the remainder of this Part
sets forth the means by which law and law enforcement may influ-
ence norms, and the means by which norms may influence
behavior.
B. The Influence of Law and Law Enforcement on Norms
The legal literature has provided several important insights into
the mechanisms by which law and law enforcement may influence
norms. Norms theorists have asserted that law and law enforce-
ment may both trigger existing norms and shape norms. Although
the triggering and shaping of norms may be hard to distinguish,
for the purposes of this analysis they will be discussed separately.
The "triggering" of internal norms within the conceptual
framework refers to the way that law and law enforcement may in-
duce existing norms to influence compliance decision-making. In
some cases, law and law enforcement will only influence the inter-
nal norms of the environmental decision-maker. In other cases,
third parties also will be induced to exert external norm influences
on the decision-maker or the decision-maker will perceive those
influences to be likely.
1. Norm activation.
The conceptual framework proposed in this article includes a
triggering mechanism that has been widely employed in empirical
plaining or predicting behavior. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REv. 1781, 1788 (2000). A review of the regulatory compliance litera-
ture suggests that internal norms are likely to have a substantial influence on environmen-
tal compliance decision-making. In fact, the leading environmental compliance studies
suggest that when internal norms are strongly held or are triggered by a particular event,
other factors have little influence on compliance decision-making. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 265-72. Consequently, excluding internal norms from an analysis of environ-
mental compliance may undermine the predictive capacity of the analysis. For this reason,
I have included internal norms in the conceptual framework presented in this article.
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studies by social psychologists but has not been discussed in the
legal norms literature: the Schwartz norm activation theory.49 The
theory suggests that a norm's influence on behavior is affected by
the intensity of the obligation felt by the individual. Two factors are
necessary to "activate" the existing norms of individuals: (1) an
awareness of the consequences of the individual's act regarding the
welfare of others (awareness of consequences is commonly re-
ferred to in the literature as "AC"); and (2) an ascription of per-
sonal responsibility for causing or preventing those consequences
(ascription of responsibility is commonly referred to as "AR").
These two factors lead to the activation of a norm, generating a
feeling of obligation to comply with the norm and guilt if the norm
is violated. As initially proposed, the theory suggested that AC and
AR can activate "moral norms"5" that affect human welfare, leading
to a behavioral intention to act altruistically.5' More recently, study
results have supported the theory in a wide range of areas, includ-
ing situations involving norms related to the environment.5 2 For
example, in a study of yard brush burning, researchers found that
individuals who were aware of the human health impacts of burn-
ing and accepted responsibility for it were less likely to burn yard
waste than others.53
49. See Shalom H. Schwartz, A Normative Decision-Making Model of Altruism, in ALTRUISM
AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 189, 193-202 (Jacqueline Macauley & Leonard Berkowitz eds.,
1970) [hereinafter Moral Decision Making]. See also Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences
on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 222 (Leonard Berkowitz
ed., 1977) [hereinafter Normative Influences]. Although the term "ascription of responsibil-
ity" is commonly used in the literature, Schwartz indicated that "responsibility denial" is a
preferable term for the concept, since the latter term emphasizes the defensive nature of
the concept. In other words, the concept refers to the tendency to deny responsibility for
an act after the fact, rather than to "a spontaneous tendency to see the self as responsible
for events initially." Id. at 230 n.4. His work has been widely viewed as including AC and AR
as the two factors that activate norms. See sources cited infra notes 50-53.
50. The term "moral norms" was used by Schwartz. See Normative Influences, supra note
49, at 277. Note that norm activation may differ depending on whether the consequences
relate to human health or the environment. See Riley E. Dunlap & Kent D. Van Liere, Land
Ethic or Golden Rule: A Comment on "Land Ethic Realized" b' Thomas A. Heberlien, 33 J. Soc.
ISSUES 200, 204-05 (1977); see also Thomas A. Heberlein, The Land Ethic Realized: Some Social
Psychological Explanations for Changing Environmental Attitudes, 28 J. Soc. ISSUES 79 (1972).
51. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 47, at 412.
52. See, e.g., Stern et al., supra note 35, at 85.
53. See Kent D. Van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, Moral Norms and Environmental Behavior:
An Application of Schwartz's Norm-Activation Model to Yard Burning, 8J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
,174, 187 (1978). Van Liere and Dunlap described the relevant norm as "respect for the
health of others." Id. They evaluated AC by evaluating responses to the following: "Some
people say that the smoke from backyard burning makes it difficult for people with respira-
tory problems to breathe. Do you agree or disagree?" Id. at 179. They evaluated AR by
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Following the Schwartz norm activation theory, an enforcement
intervention may activate some or all of the norms relevant to envi-
ronmental compliance if it provides information about the conse-
quences of a noncompliant act and the individual's responsibility
for or ability to prevent those consequences. The information
could be imparted through a wide range of enforcement interven-
tions, including inspections and administrative or judicial penalty
actions. Norms triggered in this way may have a positive or negative
effect on the individual's intention to comply, depending on the
mix of norms activated. The norms triggered in Schwartz's theory
are internal norms, although the triggering information also may
lead to changes in an individual's perception of the likelihood of
external norm enforcement by co-workers, social acquaintances or
the general public.
A related triggering mechanism has been noted only in passing
in the legal norms literature, but it also may be quite important for
environmental compliance. This triggering mechanism suggests
that law and law enforcement can lead an individual to focus atten-
tion on the existence of a norm. 4 The information conveyed may
not relate to AC or AR, but simply to the existence of a norm. For
example, a permit application may not only threaten legal sanc-
tions for false statements but may highlight the widely shared norm
of law compliance. Empirical studies suggest that focusing atten-
tion on a norm may make the norm more salient during the com-
pliance decision-making process.55 As with norm activation, the
asking for agreement or disagreement with two propositions: (1) "Some people say that
backyard burning should not be allowed because many people are not able to take wastes
to the dump and cannot afford to have them hauled to the dump;" and (2) "Some people
say backyard burning should be allowed because the amount of pollution it causes is very
small compared to other sources such as automobiles." Id. at 179-80.
54. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Con-
cept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015
(1990) (suggesting that the influence of norms at the individual, situational and societal
levels will vary by the extent of the individual's focus on the norms or their salience or
activation); P. Wesley Schultz, Changing Behavior with Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field
Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BAsic & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 26 (1998) (sug-
gesting that "feedback" can focus individuals on internal and external norms and influence
recycling behavior).
55. See generally Cialdini et al., supra note 54. See also Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus
Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in
Human Behavior, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SoCIAL PSYCHOLOcY 201, 201-04 (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 1991) [hereinafter Refinement and Reevaluation]; Robert B. Cialdini, Social Moti-
vations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles, in 2 TAxPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 211 (Jeffrey
A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) [hereinafter Social Motivations to Comply]. Cialdini's
work has been widely cited in the legal norms literature, but the notion of focusing has not
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information that induces the decision-maker to focus on an inter-
nal norm also may lead to actual or perceived increases in external
norm enforcement by others. For example, individuals were found
to litter less when a single piece of litter was placed in a garage
than when the garage was clean. The single piece of litter may have
made a pre-existing anti-littering norm salient and may have led to
the reduction in littering by those who observed it.5 6
2. Additional mechanisms.
The legal norms literature has identified several additional.
mechanisms by which law and law enforcement may not only trig-
ger existing norms, but may shape norms that affect environmental
compliance. For example, the law can tie internal, abstract norms
("be a good parent") to concrete norms ("good parents use child
safety seats"), and thus lead to new behavioral intentions.57 This
tying effect may explain how new information can lead to swift
changes in concrete norms, while abstract norms remain more re-
sistant to change." In addition, laws and enforcement actions may
increase an individual decision-maker's perceptions of the exis-
tence of a consensus regarding a norm. This perception may in-
duce the individual to internalize the norm. The signaling of the
consensus also may reduce the perceived risk to norm enforcers
and may facilitate the widespread enforcement of a concrete social
norm. The perception thus may increase the individual's view of
the likelihood and severity of external social sanctions.
The law also can change or obscure social meanings." These
changed social meanings, in turn, can lead to changes in the
been highlighted. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean , 63 U. Cm. L.
REv. 591, 592 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 39, at 903.
56. See Cialdini et al., supra note 54, at 1025-26.
57. McAdams, supra note 1, at 408.
58. Information learned by the individual during the entire regulatory process can
affect norm activation. Hence norm activation may be enhanced by, among other things,
the choice of participatory rather than non-participatory processes in regulatory develop-
ment. Similarly, regulators may affect norm activation in the promulgation phase by pro-
viding more or less thorough or clear explanations of a new regulatory requirement. I
focus on enforcement here, but careful study is also warranted on how such choices in
regulatory processes can affect the activation of norms that in turn shape environmental
compliance.
59. See Kahan, supra note 55, at 591; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHi. L. REv. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2021, 2046 (1996); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 191 (2001) (evaluating the social meaning of the
command and control environmental regulatory system).
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norms that are triggered by a particular behavior. One widely cited
example is that a seat belt law may change a passenger's decision to
wear a seat belt in a cab from an affront to the driver's competence
to a simple act of law compliance.6 ° Such a change in the social
meaning of an action also could occur in the environmental com-
pliance arena. For example, the type of criminal charge brought
against a polluter may affect the social meaning of the violation.
Following a release of a toxic material that caused a death, the use
of a civil environmental, criminal environmental, or manslaughter
charge may convey very different social meanings and may have
different effects on the internal norms of the defendant. In partic-
ular, a manslaughter charge may create a perception that the be-
havior is analogous to a serious street crime in a way that a civil or
criminal environmental action may not. These different social
meanings also may affect whether the defendant becomes the sub-
ject of external social sanctions. 61 Conversely, to the extent en-
forcement actions are based merely on paperwork violations that
do not reflect an intent to hide noncompliance, the social meaning
of the label "environmental violator" may become ambiguous.
C. The Influence of Norms on Behavior
A better understanding of how law and law enforcement may
trigger or shape norms leads to the next step in the analysis: the
effect on behavior. Internal norms and perceptions about the likely
external norm sanctions and legal sanctions arising from environ-
mental noncompliance may influence behavioral intentions and
resulting courses of action. The empirical literature suggests that
this process is complex. Each of the internal norms may have vary-
ing levels of influence on the individual's behavioral intentions, de-
pending on the combination and strength of the triggered norms.
The norms may function in an additive or multiplicative fashion,
or may be lexically ordered, with the norm that is most available to
the individual playing a far greater role in the individual's behav-
ioral intentions than the other norms that are held but not
activated.62
60. See Lessig, supra note 59, at 952.
61. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 472 (1997) (discussing how an endangerment or manslaughter prosecution may sig-
nal the inclusion of environmental actions within "the norm against endangering others").
See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609 (1998).
62. See, e.g., Grasmick & Green, supra note 15, at 329 (discussing the "conditional
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The relative weighting of formal sanctions, external sanctions
and internal sanctions also may involve complex processes. For ex-
ample, one empirical study suggests that the existence of a strongly
held internal norm of law compliance is very influential in deter-
mining the behavioral intent of potential decision-makers regard-
ing corporate environmental compliance, and in some cases may
make the other two factors "virtually superfluous." 3
Although internal norms, external norms and formal legal
sanctions often may predict the formation of an intention to com-
ply, external constraints also may affect whether the intention is
translated into action.6 4 For example, a lack of financial or techno-
logical resources may limit the ability to comply, even where there
is an intent to do so. Moreover, the complexity of legal require-
ments may constitute another barrier to actual compliance.65
When external constraints prevent an individual from acting on a
behavioral intention, individuals may employ mechanisms that
neutralize guilt.6 6 Guilt neutralization mechanisms include redefin-
ing the problem in a way that does not trigger the applicable norm,
asserting that others are to blame for the harm, or asserting that no
alternatives existed to the course of action taken.
hypothesis" that the threat of legal punishment has a deterrent effect only against individu-
als who are not morally committed to the law). Similarly, Blake and Davis have suggested
that internal norms, external norms, formal legal sanctions and other factors have inde-
pendent effects on compliance. SeeJudith Blake & Kingsley Davis, Norms, Values and Sanc-
tions, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 456 (Robert E.L. Fars ed., 1964). Alternatively,
there could be multiplicative or interactive effects among norms, as suggested in a classic
work by Talcott Parsons. See TALcOTr PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 402-03
(1937); see also Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 18, at 204-06.
63. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality:
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 L. & Soc'v REV. 549, 575 (1996).
64. In the long run, the conceptual framework proposed here may need to be ad-
justed to reflect the importance of perceived behavioral control. Ajzen has proposed the
theory of planned behavior, which posits that behavioral intentions are the product of
three independent variables: (1) the "attitude" of the individual; (2) the individual's per-
ception of "subjective norms"; and (3) the individual's perceived behavioral control. Ajzen
suggests that increases in these three variables lead to increases in behavioral intention.
More specifically, he suggests that an individual's attitude toward a behavior becomes more
favorable as the perceived social pressure to perform the behavior increases; and as the
perceived ability to perform the behavior increases, the individual's intention to perform
the behavior increases. See Isaac Ajzen, From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behav-
ior, in ACTION CONTROL: FROM COGNITION TO BEHAVIOR 11 (Julius Kuhl & Jfirgen Beck-
mann eds., 1987). Survey results suggest that many people believe they cannot control
many global and regional environmental problems. See, e.g., GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C.
STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 224 (1996).
65. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 13, at 932-37.
66. See Normative Influences, supra note 49, at 255-57.
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The actual thought processes corporate managers undergo to
make decisions about environmental compliance are not well un-
derstood. In the framework proposed here, it is assumed that the
decision-maker will make rational choices about compliance based
on perceptions of the benefits and costs of noncompliance, includ-
ing the perceived certainty and severity of the formal legal and in-
formal social sanctions.67 Empirical testing of the research agenda
set forth in this article may suggest modifications to this assump-
tion. The next Part identifies the norms that are the source of the
informal social sanctions.
III. A TYPOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS
This Part proposes a typology of the norms that influence cor-
porate environmental compliance. The norms discussed here func-
tion as abstract, internal norms and, in some cases, also as external
norms. The norms exist among corporate managers, government
regulators, environmental group members and the general public.
The discussion of each norm begins with a hypothesis in the form
of a sentence that expresses the norm, followed by an explanation
of how the norm is distinguishable from and interacts with other
norms. The discussion then reviews the studies that suggest the ex-
istence of the norm and evaluates the implications of the norm for
environmental compliance.
A few caveats are in order. First, this is not a list of all norms
that affect corporate environmental compliance but of those that
are likely to have the greatest influence. The norms were selected
based on several criteria: (1) the existence of each norm has been
identified by or may be inferred from empirical studies; (2) based
on my review of the empirical studies, the norms identified in the
typology are those most likely to have a substantial influence on
environmental compliance; and (3) their influence is plausible
based on the types of requirements imposed by environmental laws
and the types of interactions managers may have with enforcement
67. I do not attempt to account for the influence of cognitive biases on the decision-
making process in this article, but these issues are worthy of further study. See, e.g., Thomas
Dietz & Paul C. Stern, Toward a Theory of Choice: Socially Embedded Preference Construction, 24J.
Socio-EcoN. 261, 266 (1995) (explaining that "human cognitive structure probably devel-
oped under selective regimes that favor skilled taxonomists rather than powerful calculat-
ing machines," and concluding that "processes based on checks and balances among key
interests and values are more likely to approximate normatively ideal social choices than
are simple quantitative aggregations of individuals' expressions of preference"). See gener-
ally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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agencies, co-workers, social acquaintances, environmental group
members, and others.
Second, these are only proposed norms. The research on
norms and regulatory compliance is limited, its conclusions are
often mixed, and it is difficult to compare conclusions across disci-
plinary lines. In some cases, empirical studies have elicited data re-
garding the existence of a specific norm through survey research.
In other cases, the research has identified only patterns of behavior
from which a norm can be inferred. In yet other cases, the phe-
nomenon I describe as a norm may have been given a different
label by others, but it appears to function as a norm, and I have
chosen to include it as a norm in the typology to maintain a consis-
tent approach to the framework. The norms therefore will need to
be tested to verify their existence and influence. Actual identifica-
tion of any norm has a somewhat wooden feel, but until the norms
can be framed precisely they cannot be tested. This typology is a
first effort to do so. Very few studies have attempted to link norms
to actual environmental compliance decisions, and I have supple-
mented the environmental literature with studies on compliance
with criminal laws, as well as tax, health care, worker safety and
other regulatory regimes. The tax compliance studies are particu-
larly valuable given the extensive quantitative research that has
been conducted on the relationship between norms and tax com-
pliance, and the similarities between the tax and environmental
regulatory regimes.68
68. The many similarities between the tax and environmental regulatory schemes
suggest that the lessons of the tax compliance research will be relevant to environmental
compliance. For example, tax and environmental law both include large components that
many view as malum prohibitum, rather than malum in se. Both fields grapple with tensions
between maximizing compliance and maximizing social welfare. See, e.g., James Andreoni,
Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 826-27 (1998)
(discussing the potential goals of tax enforcement). In addition, each field consists of a
complex scheme of statutory and regulatory requirements, along with an extensive "gray
law" of policy statements, memoranda, guidances and other non-binding agency pro-
nouncements. In many cases, it is difficult and expensive for the regulated community to
gain a full understanding of the legal requirements from these numerous and sometimes
vague or conflicting sources. Another point of similarity is that tax and environmental law
both affect diverse regulated communities that include individuals as well as large and
small businesses. With respect to both fields, perceptions about the legitimacy of different
types of requirements can vary greatly among various members of the regulated commu-
nity. Finally, both tax and environmental law rely on enforcement resources that are very
scarce relative to the size of the regulated community, making it impossible to inspect and
sanction a significant percentage of non-compliers. As a result of that and other factors,
regulators in both fields increasingly rely on self-reported information as a principal means
of detecting violations. See id. at 821 (noting "the dramatic increase in information report-
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The norms of environmental compliance are grouped below
into substantive norms and procedural norms, followed by discus-
sion of a "norm of conformity" to account for interdependence
among individuals. Although distinctions between substance and
procedure are often not illuminating, the work of Tom Tyler and
others suggests that many norms relevant to law compliance may
follow this dichotomy. In particular, studies of street crime and sev-
eral regulatory compliance areas have found that compliance rates
are affected by two distinct components: (1) consistency of the law
with the individual's moral beliefs; and (2) procedural fairness.69
A. Substantive Norms
Several norms may influence the consistency of the law with
one's moral beliefs, or "substantive consistency" regarding environ-
mental compliance. These norms are substantive in that they are
triggered by the outcome of the compliance behavior (e.g., the ef-
fect on the environment), rather than by the individual's interac-
tions with a government agency (e.g., the enforcement penalty
negotiations with a government attorney). The substantive norms
include norms of law compliance, human health protection, envi-
ronmental protection and autonomy. The norm of law compliance
is perhaps the most commonly identified norm associated with reg-
ulatory compliance, and many studies conflate this norm with the
other substantive norms. For example, sociologists commonly refer
simply to "moral commitment" to comply with the law.y" As the
discussion below indicates, however, studies of norms and regula-
tory compliance suggest that moral commitment to law compliance
ing in the U.S. since the 1960s"). Also as a result of the scarcity of enforcement resources,
both fields have made increasing use of compliance assistance methods to supplement
deterrence-based enforcement in the last two decades. See, e.g., Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity
and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 44,
at 223; EPA and the States, supra note 8, at 10,806-12 (examining the expansion of compli-
ance assistance programs in state and federal environmental enforcement programs). The
tax compliance literature has been examined by a number of legal theorists. See, e.g.,
Kahan, supra note 21, at 349; Posner, supra note 48; Sunstein, supra note 39, at 903.
69. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4-5, 62, 161 (1990) (concluding
that compliance rates are associated with internalized norms of justice and obligation,
based on a longitudinal study involving initial interviews of 1575 randomly selected citi-
zens, and 804 follow-up interviews after one year). Tyler's conclusions are consistent with
other studies in the criminal and tax compliance literature. See, e.g., Panel on Taxpayer
Compliance Research, Understanding Taxpayer Compliance: Self-Interest, Social Commitment,
and Other Influences, in 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 92 (Jeffrey A. Roth et al. eds., 1989).
70. See, e.g., Grasmick & Green, supra note 15, at 325.
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alone is unlikely to account for the range of norm influences on
environmental compliance.
1. The norm of law compliance.
Hypothesis. The norm of law compliance may take strong, inter-
mediate and weak forms. The strong form can be expressed as fol-
lows: "An individual should comply with, laws even when they are
inconsistent with moral obligations." The intermediate form can
be expressed as follows: "An individual should comply with laws so
long as they are not inconsistent with moral obligations." The weak
form can be expressed as follows: "An individual should comply
with laws that are consistent with moral obligations."
In one sense, all of the other substantive norms can be thought
of as independent variables that lead to increases or decreases in
the intensity of the norm of law compliance, and the norm of law
compliance can be seen as a dependent variable. But the norm of
law compliance is a distinct norm that creates a sense of obligation
in some situations without regard to the influence of the other sub-
stantive or procedural norms. The intermediate and strong forms
are perhaps the best case for this phenomenon. Some individuals
appear to hold the intermediate form of the norm: they form in-
tentions to comply with laws that do not raise issues of consistency
with other norms. For example, one may form an intent to comply
simply because the law requires it, without any perceived risk of
enforcement or concern about harm to human health or the envi-
ronment. 71 Simply put, some people will form an intention to act
simply because doing so complies with the law. In addition, some
individuals appear to hold the strong form of the norm: they form
intentions to comply with a law even though the law is inconsistent
with their own moral beliefs.1
2
71. As Tyler has noted, "[p]eople clearly have a strong predisposition toward follow-
ing the law. If authorities can tap into such feelings, their decisions will be more widely
followed." TYLER, supra note 69, at 65. The norm of law compliance thus is closely related
to the notion of legitimacy. To the extent an individual views an authority as legitimate,
studies suggest that an individual is more likely to comply with the law. This proposition
holds true for some individuals even though the required action conflicts with their self-
interest. See id. at 26, 28 (noting that legitimate authority "rests on a conception of obliga-
tion to obey any commands an authority issues so long as that authority is acting within
appropriate limits" and noting the importance of studying legitimacy by examining "the
perceived obligation to obey the law").
72. Tyler notes that 82% of respondents in one study agreed that "a person should
obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right." See id. at 45. In one study cited
by Tyler, 70% of all adults answered that a law "must always be obeyed." See id. at 31; see also
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Empirical tests may not be able to distinguish the weak form of
the law compliance norm from the norms of human health and
environmental protection discussed below. If an individual believes
that harming human health or the environment is wrong, human
health or environmental norms may be triggered and it may not be
possible to identify a distinct influence arising from the norm of
law compliance. On the other hand, empirical testing may reveal
that the weak form of the norm of law compliance has synergistic
effects with the human health and environmental norms. For ex-
ample, law or law enforcement may tie an act of noncompliance
with law to a human health norm and trigger a stronger sense of
obligation than if either norm were activated independently. An
enforcement action that identifies how an act damaged a sensitive
ecosystem in addition to violating a specific statutory provision may
trigger environmental protection and law compliance norms in an
individual with even the weak form of the law compliance norm.
Conversely, studies may find that if certain other substantive or
procedural norms are triggered, the norms may counteract one an-
other. For example, if an individual perceives a rule to be unneces-
sarily restrictive or perceives that she has been treated unfairly in
an enforcement proceeding, the norms of autonomy or fair pro-
cess may counteract the effects of the norm of law compliance.
One may hold a norm of law compliance, yet not feel obligated to
comply or feel guilty in the absence of compliance because of the
effect of these other norms.
Empirical Studies. The norm of law compliance has been studied
directly through survey research. Studies suggest, for example, that
many individuals comply with some criminal laws because of a
norm of law compliance, even though noncompliance creates little
or no risk of enforcement and does not implicate other norms.73
At least one study suggests that this effect occurs with regard to
environmental compliance.74 Other studies have detected patterns
of behavior from which the norm may be inferred. For example,
the commitment to obey tax laws appears to follow the commit-
Austin Sarat, Supportfor the Legal System, 3 AM. POL. Q. 3 (1975). In another study, 93% of
respondents gave a similar answer. See Bob K. Boynton, Samuel C. Patterson & Robert C.
Hedlund, The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI.
163, 166 (1968). Likewise, in a study of high school students, more than 70% gave a similar
answer. Harrell Rodgers & Edward Lewis, Political Support and Compliance Attitudes: A Study
Of Adolescents, 2 AM. POL. Q. 61, 66-67 (1974).
73. See TYLER, supra note 69, at 31-32.
74. See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 63, at 549.
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ment to obey laws in general.75 Similarly, studies suggest that focus-
ing an individual's attention on the moral obligation to comply
with the law is associated with increases in law compliance.76
The norm of law compliance may be enforced internally or ex-
ternally. Empirical studies suggest that guilt is the principal inter-
nal enforcement mechanism that sanctions violations of the norm
of law compliance.77 As discussed above, the empirical literature
suggests a number of ways in which guilt can be neutralized, in-
cluding the lack of an identifiable victim, complexity of the law, the
defense of necessity, condemnation of the system, denial of respon-
sibility and appeal to higher loyalties.78 Although each of these
guilt neutralization factors is worthy of further study, complexity
and the lack of an identifiable victim are perhaps most important
for environmental compliance. The complexity factor is discussed
here, and the lack of an identifiable victim is discussed below in
connection with the human health and environmental protection
norms.
Cooperation model advocates assert that deterrence-based en-
forcement measures can undermine motivations to comply when
directed at regulated entities that were motivated to comply but
lacked the capacity to understand their obligations because of the
complexity of the regulatory scheme.79 The argument is plausible
on its face. Environmental regulations have been described as
"stupefyingly"' ° and "breathtakingly"'" complex. A leading text-
book describes the pathway through the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, which regulates the hazardous waste handling
activities of hundreds of thousands of large and small businesses, as
75. See Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 120 (citing
studies).
76. See Cialdini et al., supra note 54, at 1015.
77. See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Spe-
cial Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999).
78. See Normative Influences, supra note 49, at 255-57. Thurman has identified "guilt
neutralization attitudes" that are related to self-reported tax compliance in addition to
social and legal sanctions, and commitment. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research,
supra note 69, at 125 (citing Q.C. Thurman, Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective
Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws?, 6 LAW & POL'Y 309 (1984)).
79. See Bruce M. Diamond, Confessions of an Environmental Enforcer, 26 Envfl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,252, 10,253-54 (1996); Spence, supra note 13, at 973.
80. Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J.
395, 411 (1995).
81. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 2
(3d ed. 2000).
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a "mind-numbing journey. '8 2 On occasion, courts have ruled
against EPA in civil enforcement actions because the complexity of
the regulatory scheme failed to provide a regulated firm with fair
notice of its legal obligations.8" In addition, several studies have
noted that a substantial amount of noncompliance in heavily regu-
lated industries arises from an inability to understand complex reg-
ulatory requirements.8 4 The same phenomenon appears to exist in
tax compliance: the complexity of the tax system appears to gener-
ate uncertainty among taxpayers about the actual amounts of tax
liability.
8 5
In the environmental area, however, the study results are anec-
dotal, and neither the extent of this complexity-based incapacity
nor its role in causing noncompliance has been studied systemati-
cally. Several qualitative studies support the conclusion that one
may hold a norm of law compliance yet not feel obliged to comply
or feel guilty in the absence of compliance. In a well-known study
in the early 1980s, Bardach and Kagan concluded that the vast ma-
jority of business managers were "arrayed over a spectrum of bor-
derline to moderate to really good apples" and share many of the
regulators' concerns about social problems.86 The authors noted
that enforcement actions against well-intentioned business manag-
ers can affect compliance by contributing to a "culture of resis-
tance" in the regulated community. They concluded that rather
than increasing compliance, aggressive enforcement often contrib-
utes to a perception of regulatory unreasonableness, which reduces
the managers' commitment to law compliance and undermines
82. Id. at 212 (quoting American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
83. See, e.g., General Electric Corp. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-33 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(concluding that General Electric lacked "fair warning" of EPA's regulatory interpreta-
tion); Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 987 (1st Cir. 1995) (vacat-
ing a grant of summary judgment because the term "cyanides" was ambiguous, and did not
provide the defendant with fair notice). Complexity concerns are also reflected in the Su-
preme Court's criminal law jurisprudence. Cases have concluded that mens rea standards
for willful conduct require that a defendant know of his duty and voluntarily and intention-
ally violate that duty. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 501 U.S. 135 (1994) (structuring
transactions to avoid cash reporting requirements); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192
(1991) (tax crimes).
84. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 13, at 972-73.
85. Andreoni et al., supra note 68, at 834.
86. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 65 (1982). This book presents the leading qualitative
study of the impact of regulatory unreasonableness on "cultures of resistance" to environ-
mental laws and other laws, and the impact of these cultures on the legitimacy of the law.
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general norms of social responsibility. 7 Quantitative studies of
nursing home and mine safety regulatory compliance suggest that
a culture of resistance is associated with lower levels of compli-
ance.88 No quantitative empirical studies, however, have examined
the relationship among complexity, the culture of resistance and
environmental compliance rates.89
The concept of guilt neutralization suggests that the complexity
of environmental laws could have an important effect beyond con-
tributing to a culture of resistance. Complexity may create ambigu-
ity regarding law compliance, which in turn may reduce the guilt
arising from a violation. The empirical studies suggest that the
complexity concern identified by the cooperation model advocates
should focus not just on the effects of complexity on creating a
culture of resistance, but also on ambiguity and the ambiguity
caused by complexity. For example, tax compliance studies have
demonstrated that although complexity is not often identified as a
problem, the "moral latitude arising from gray areas and ambiguity
in the tax laws emerged as a major motivation for noncompli-
ance."9 ° As demonstrated by the tax studies, legal ambiguities can
lead individuals in the regulated community to create guilt neutral-
ization mechanisms. 91 Even in the absence of enforcement inter-
ventions, therefore, the complexity of environmental laws may lead
to ambiguity regarding the scope of the requirements, less influ-
ence from the norm of law compliance, and less compliance.
Implications. If studies confirm the influence of the norm of law
compliance on environmental behavior, a number of changes to
environmental laws and enforcement policies may be appropriate.
For individuals who demonstrate the strong or intermediate forms
87. Id. at 113.
88. Braithwaite and Makkai conducted a quantitative examination of the culture of
resistance hypothesis on nursing home compliance and concluded that those who self-
reported views identified with a culture of resistance were less likely to comply with nursing
home regulations. SeeJohn Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Criminological Theories and Regulatory
Compliance, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 191, 206 (1991); see also AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13,
at 101-32 (discussing mine safety studies).
89. Exacerbating the gap in quantitative studies are alleged shortcomings in the qual-
itative empirical work. For example, a review of the Bardach and Kagan study suggested
that "[e]valuating this book poses serious difficulties, chiefly because the empirical status
of the authors' arguments is unclear" and concluded that "Bardach and Kagan make no
effort to obtain a representative sample." Richard L. Abel, Book Review: Risk as an Area of
Struggle, 83 MICH. L. REV. 772, 773 (1985) (reviewing EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KA-
GAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982)).
90. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 129.
91. Id.
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of the norm of law compliance, enforcement agencies may be able
to use focusing mechanisms to increase compliance, including re-
minders of moral obligations to comply with the law in environ-
mental permit applications, data reports and other similar
documents. Reminders about the existence of a moral obligation
to comply with the law may enhance compliance,9 2 and a statement
in a permit application or other document regarding not just the
sanction for noncompliance, but the moral obligation to comply
with the law may influence individuals who hold the strong form of
the norm of law compliance. Thus, the law compliance norm may
become more salient and may influence behavior.
Guilt neutralization studies also have potentially important im-
plications. Calls to simplify environmental regulations have been
standard fare for many years. EPA has made strides in this area, yet
the command and control environmental statutes dictate remarka-
bly prescriptive, hence complex, requirements. To address this
complexity, EPA recently has allocated additional resources to
compliance assistance and has participated in the federal govern-
ment's "Plain English" initiatives to make environmental require-
ments more understandable." The empirical research indicates
that compliance assistance and simplification efforts may have
greater importance than previously recognized. The research sug-
gests that efforts directed at explaining and simplifying complex or
ambiguous requirements may not only increase the capacity of the
regulated community to comply and avoid widespread develop-
ment of a culture of resistance, but also may affect motivations to
comply by supporting the norm of law compliance and increasing
the strength of the guilt that arises from noncompliance. 4
The norm of law compliance also has implications arising from
external norm effects. The public disclosure of information about
environmental law compliance and the human health and environ-
mental effects of noncompliance is far less restricted than is disclo-
sure of tax compliance information. As a result, noncompliance
information may be more frequently available for external social
sanctioning in the environmental field.9" For example, EPA identi-
92. See Cialdini et al., supra note 54, at 1015.
93. See, e.g., Executive Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (imposing plain
language requirements on federal agencies); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A PLAIN ENGLISH
GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR Acr (1993).
94. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-305-R-99-01, EPA/CMA RooT CAUSE ANALYSIS
PILOT PROJECT: AN INDUSTRY SURVEY 27 (1999).
95. Information also should be more available in the environmental area than in the
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fies "significant noncompliers" under many of its programs, and
the Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis (IDEA) database
provides public access to compliance data on more than ten EPA
enforcement programs. The Sector Facility Indexing Project pro-
vides compliance data on approximately 650 facilities in five indus-
trial sectors.96 In addition, EPA and environmental groups have
made facility-specific and area-specific data available on the
Internet.
9 7
Nevertheless, additional steps could be taken to enhance the
influence of compliance data on norms. For example, although
government compliance databases are publicly available, they often
are difficult to access and the data are difficult to evaluate. This
effectively limits the availability of the information to the subpopu-
lation of environmental or community health activists who are suf-
ficiently committed to invest the necessary time and effort to
access, review and understand the data. If those with knowledge of
environmental violations are isolated from others within the regu-
lated firm, or if company employees, officers or principals are iso-
lated from those in the community who know and care about
environmental compliance, then the opportunity for informal so-
cial control may be limited.9" At least two studies suggest that the
widespread publication, as opposed to availability, of environmen-
tal information may lead to improved performance.99 Although
worker health and safety areas. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regula-
tory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 97, 144-46 (2000).
96. U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE,
EPA 300-K-99-01, PROTECTING YOUR HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAST 5 YEARS 27 (1999).
97. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, ScoREcARD, at http://www.scorecard.org (last
visited Oct. 27, 2002).
98. Studies of individual environmental behavior suggest that simple barriers (such as
inconvenience) may have a strong negative influence on the effect of social norms. SeeAnn
E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1281-85 (2001). If the inconvenience of
gathering information serves as a barrier, it may have a surprisingly large impact on the
effect of external norm sanctioning. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RE-
SPONSIVE REGULATION 63 (2002) (concluding that "conversational regulation" is often
more effective than formal enforcement or deterrence actions).
99. See, e.g., J~r6me Foulon et al., Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation and(?) or(?)
Information [sic] 31 (World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper, Oct. 1999)
(concluding that "the public disclosure of environmental performance does create addi-
tional and strong incentives for pollution control" based on a study of pulp mills in British
Columbia) (emphasis in original), available at http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/work-pa
per/andor/index.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2002); Shakeb Afsah et al., Regulation in the
Information Age: Indonesian Public Information Program for Environmental Management 5-8
(World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper, March 1997) (describing the
effect on environmental performance of public rankings of industrial facilities in Indone-
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some types of environmental enforcement actions capitalize on va-
rious forms of public disclosure, such as publication of Clean
Water Act violations in local newspapers, there are a number of
unexplored avenues to pursue.'00 For example, although several
scholars have evaluated the potential effects of product labeling
requirements, 10 1 new statutory provisions or settlement agreements
could require facilities to post information about compliance and
levels of pollutants emitted at the facility boundary. Information
identified at the plant entrance or boundary may have an impact
on the internal norms of company employees and officers and on
external norm enforcement by members of the local community.
To address the influence of the norm of law compliance on
those who intend to comply but lack the capacity, enforcement
agencies may need to develop new screening mechanisms to iden-
tify and target different enforcement interventions toward catego-
ries of individuals or regulated firms with strong or weak norms of
law compliance. This effort should enable the agencies to better
calibrate the use of deterrence-based and other enforcement
interventions. -
2. The norm of human health protection.
Hypothesis. This norm can be expressed simply: "An individual
should not cause harm to human health." In this formulation, the
norm is a version of the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you." 0 2 Examples of this norm include
the guilt felt by a plant manager who acts in a way that is legal but
that nevertheless harms human health, or the additional guilt felt
by a plant manager if violating an environmental law also leads to
sia), available at http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/work-paper/govern/index.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 11, 2002).
100. See, e.g., General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources of Pol-
lution, 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(f)(2) (vii) (2002) (requiring public water treatment facilities to
publicize acts of "significant noncompliance" by reporting such incidents annually in the
largest newspaper in the city where the non-compliant facilities are located); see also David
A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811 (2001).
101. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy,
54 MD. L. REv. 1435, 1468-69 (1995).
102. See Dunlap & Van Liere, supra note 50, at 205 (noting the relevance of the
Golden Rule to environmental behavior); see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 61, at 471-
73 (describing the norm against endangering others). The human health and environ-
mental protection norms also closely resemble the norm of "neighborliness" that Ellickson
identified among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California. See Robert C. Ellick-
son, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv.
623, 672-73 (1986).
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harm to human health. In the alternative, if the law requires per-
formance of an act that is inconsistent with the norm, resistance to
the law and legal authorities may result.
The conceptual framework suggests that law enforcement inter-
ventions may influence behavior by signaling which types of con-
duct fall within the scope of the norm. As discussed earlier, a
prosecution of an environmental violation on a manslaughter
count may signal that the act also has violated the norm of human
health protection.10 3 Alternatively, if one complies with the norm
of human health protection, yet violates an environmental law and
is the subject of an enforcement action, the inconsistency of the
enforcement action with the human health norm may trigger con-
flicting procedural norms and undermine attachment to the norm
of law compliance. In addition, if no law requires a particular act,
yet the act is needed to prevent harm to human health, then the
norm of human health protection may lead one to act even though
the norm of law compliance is not implicated. 10 4 A potential pat-
tern of behavior that may reflect this phenomenon is the reduction
in toxic, but legal, emissions by corporations following the publica-
tion of total annual emissions data in the Toxics Release Inventory.
The development of minimum worldwide environmental standards
by companies that do business in countries with little or no effec-
tive environmental regulation also may reflect the influence of the
norm.
105
Empirical Studies. The human health and environmental protec-
tion norms are treated separately in the typology, although the
norm of human health protection easily can be conflated with the
norm of environmental protection." 6 The existence of the human
health protection norm is supported by several types of studies. Al-
though studies have not been conducted on the influence of the
human health norm on firm- or facility-level environmental com-
pliance, the impact of the norm on individual behavior has been
103. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 61, at 472 (noting that "an endangerment or
manslaughter prosecution of a polluter points out that some instances of polluting can
violate the norm against endangering others").
104. As a result, the norm of human health could be expressed instead as a variant of
the norm of law compliance as follows: "An individual should exceed legal standards in a
regulated area if they are not strong enough as written to protect human health."
105. See infra text accompanying notes 265-72.
106. See, e.g., Thomas A. Heberlein, A Rejoinder to RE. Dunlap and KD. Van Liere, 33J.
Soc. IssuEs 207, 208 (1977) (noting the importance of the distinction between norms re-
garding human and environmental well-being and noting that the Schwartz norm activa-
tion theory only explicitly refers to the activation of norms related to humans).
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examined. For example, a study of the environmental decision-
making of managers in the metal-finishing industry concluded that
the magnitude of the human health consequences of environmen-
tal decisions is strongly correlated with intentions to comply, and
that when the magnitude of the consequences was high, financial
cost did not affect the intended decision. 10 7 Other research in the
environmental area appears to confirm these findings, suggesting
that individuals tend to give greater weight to risks that have identi-
fiable human health effects than to those that do not. i08 Although
they do not address human health effects directly, studies of tax
compliance suggest that a broad human welfare norm is influen-
tial.10 9 As one study concluded, for some tax law violations the so-
cial norms that might otherwise encourage law-abidance in the
absence of fear of detection may not be operative because "each
particular offense inflicts no direct or immediate harm on any
identifiable person."' 0 For example, the failure to report barter
income is not widely seen as unacceptable."' Yet studies suggest
that when taxpayers believe that violations will harm others, they
report increased compliance. 12 Studies of other types of compli-
ance also suggest that victimless crimes may generate less guilt than
107. Brenda L. Flannery & Douglas R. May, Environmental Ethical Decision Making in
the U.S. Metal-Finishing Industry, 43 AcAD. OF MGMT. J. 642 (2000). The study presented
vignettes to managers of metal finishing firms and concluded that the intensity of the con-
sequences influenced managers' behavioral intentions. Id. at 657. Managers reported they
were more likely to reduce emissions when the magnitude of harmful consequences was
high. Id. at 654.
108. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Thomas Dietz &J. Stanley Black, Support for Environmental
Protection: The Role of Moral Norm, 8 POPULATION & ENV'T 204, 220 (1995) (concluding that
awareness of consequences regarding human health effects of toxics can activate norms
against harming innocent people). Another study concluded that information regarding
the human health effects of air pollutants emitted by the burning of yard refuse yielded
increased self-reported compliance with regulatory restrictions. The researchers found that
individuals who were aware of the human health impacts of burning and accepted respon-
sibility for it were less likely to burn yard waste than others. See Van Liere & Dunlap, supra
note 53, at 187 (describing the relevant norm as "respect for the health of others"). Other
studies of the effect of human health on norm activation have been conducted by Heber-
lien. See, e.g., Thomas A. Heberlein, The Land Ethic Realized: Some Social Psychological Explana-
tions for Changing Environmental Attitudes, 28 J. Soc. IssuEs 79 (1972).
109. See Smith, supra note 68, at 223.
110. Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in 2 TAXPAYER COM-
PLIANCE, supra note 55, at 76-77. For a study supporting the notion that "victimless" offenses
seem morally insignificant, see Nathan Glazer, On Subway Graffiti in New York, 53 PUB. INT. 3
(1979).
111. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 125.
112. See Refinement and Reevaluation, supra note 55, at 209; see also Panel on Taxpayer
Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 91-92, 175.
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crimes with identifiable victims.
1 13
Implications. The human health norm has a number of implica-
tions for environmental laws and enforcement strategies. In partic-
ular, if enforcing agencies convey information about the human
health harms of a violation rather than simply announcing the pro-
posed penalty or amount of pollutants reduced by an enforcement
action, the information may trigger internal and external norm ef-
fects. As discussed in Part II, the Schwartz norm activation theory
suggests that providing information that links an individual's ac-
tions to human health consequences and demonstrates that the in-
dividual is responsible for those consequences will activate norms.
For example, in cases where the data can be collected and ana-
lyzed, rather than announcing that a $10,000 penalty has been im-
posed and that the enforcement action prevented a ton of a
particular air pollutant from being emitted in violation of the
Clean Air Act, enforcement officials could publish information
describing the type of harm that is likely to have occurred to indi-
viduals in the community or to the environment and how that
harm could have been avoided. Although difficult to do, communi-
cating that a violation of the Clean Air Act creates these harms may
generate guilt on the part of the corporate employees and manag-
ers involved. If the information about health effects also appears in
press accounts of the violation, external social sanctioning, includ-
ing public shaming or ostracism, may occur. In short, by collecting,
analyzing and reporting data that link particular violations to par-
ticular human health harms, enforcement agencies may be able to
harness internal and external norm-based sanctions in addition to
formal legal sanctions.'14
EPA recently has attempted to link reports of environmental
113. For example, the literature on street crime suggests that drug use may not trig-
ger guilt, but larceny may. See TYLER, supra note 69, at 4. Studies of nursing home compli-
ance also have detected a human health or welfare norm. See John Braithwaite & Toni
Makkai, Can Resident Centered Inspection of Nursing Homes Work with Very Sick Residents, 24
HEALTH POL'Y 19, 27 (1997) (noting that some nursing home managers expressed ap-
proval for high patient care standards even when they viewed the standards as impractical).
114. In addition, the framing of the information communicated may be very impor-
tant. Several studies suggest that the "hot" emotional language that appears to affect envi-
ronmental and human health norms are ineffective within corporations, where a greater
premium is placed on a dry, rational vocabulary. See, e.g., Lynne M. Andersson & Thomas S.
Bateman, Individual Environmental Initiative: Championing Natural Environmental Issues in
U.S. Business Organizations, 43 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 548, 565 (2000) (noting that "hot" emo-
tional appeals were ineffective in a study of environmental champions within corpora-
tions); see also ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES 101-33 (1988) (describing the desiccated
moral climate within corporations).
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performance to human health and environmental harms and to
coordinate this effort with state enforcement agencies through a
variety of initiatives. Nevertheless, activity counts (e.g., the number
of orders issued or cases filed) still dominate the data collection
and reporting efforts.1 15 The linkage between enforcement and
human health and environmental quality is extremely difficult to
make, and in most cases EPA has only been able to identify the
amount of pollutants reduced by an enforcement action, not the
corresponding effect on human health or the environment.'16 In
addition, the tort liability implications of linking a specific release
to human health or environmental harms may create strong incen-
tives for firms to dispute government assertions of linkages."1 7 Nev-
ertheless, a number of federal, state and local programs have
demonstrated the ability of EPA and the states to collect, analyze
and report data on human health and environmental outcomes.'18
To date, data collection efforts have been motivated principally
by a desire to better manage enforcement resources by more
closely matching the allocation of environmental enforcement re-
sources to human health and environmental risks.' 19 The alloca-
115. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS:
How EPA AND THE STATES CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
INFORMATION 24 (2001) (noting "incomplete activities-focused data").
116. The current number of monitoring stations is inadequate in many areas; and
the link between particular reductions in noncompliance rates or in pollutants emitted
and changes in human health and environmental quality is poorly understood in some
cases. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER QUALITY. KEY EPA AND STATE DECI-
SIONS LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE DATA 8-9 (2000) (noting that states have
assessed water quality for only ninteen percent of rivers and streams, and forty percent of
lakes, and that only about half of the assessments included site surveys).
117. This concern could be addressed in several ways. Steps could be taken to make
the information less valuable in the tort process. For example, the information regarding
the human health or environmental harm could be provided on a generic basis (e.g., "vio-
lations such as this one typically cause roughly fifty additional cases of asthma per year"), or
evidentiary rules could be modified to prevent its admissibility. Alternatively, policymakers
could conclude that the information is sufficiently reliable to argue for including it in the
tort process to add to compliance incentives.
118. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 115, at 18 (discussing an effort
to tie enforcement to environmental conditions on the Charles River in Massachusetts).
119. The General Accounting Office (GAO), the National Academy of Public Admin-
istration and others have concluded that changes in human health effects and environ-
mental conditions are the most significant criteria for evaluating the success of
environmental enforcement programs. These organizations have focused on the manage-
ment benefits of targeting enforcement resources to the environmental areas of greatest
significance to human health and the environment. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN.,
supra note 115, at 21 (concluding that "data from EPA and state systems are hard to use in
assessing changes of environmental conditions at specific locations and in evaluating the
environmental and compliance performance of individual facilities, groups of facilities, or
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tion of enforcement resources to those environmental violations
that cause the greatest harm to human health or the environment
is obviously an important objective, but the added benefit of in-
creasing compliance through the use of the information on the
harms caused by noncompliance has received little attention.
EPA's effort to collect data on the environmental and human
health effects of noncompliance may not only assist with attempts
to target enforcement to the greatest risks, but also may trigger
human health and environmental protection norms, foster inter-
nal and external social sanctioning, and increase compliance. In
recent years, EPA has increased its ability to identify the amounts
of pollutants emitted, a step that represents progress over tradi-
tional activity counts. The insights of the empirical norms litera-
ture suggest that, in many cases, it may be wise to invest the
resources necessary to take the next step: to identify not only
amounts of pollutants emitted, but also to identify and explain the
connection between environmental noncompliance and human
health and environmental harms.1 0 This will be a difficult and ex-
pensive task in some situations, but the added benefits of increased
compliance arising from efforts to collect, analyze and disclose the
human health and environmental consequences of violations may
far outweigh the costs of the efforts.
The movement to link corporate environmental behavior to
human health harms may confront a paperwork paradox. Empiri-
responsible government agencies"); NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ENVIRONMENT.GOV:
TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000); see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS: ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 135-63 (2001) (noting that eighty-one percent of EPA's en-
forcement performance measures are activity-based, rather than performance-based).
120. If the effort to link environmental violations to human health harms is to influ-
ence corporate environmental compliance, it will need to be framed in a way that accounts
for both the ways in which individuals react to information about human health harms,
and the influences of the firm's organizational climate on internal and external norms. For
example, emotionally charged environmental messages have been found to activate the
human health norm among individuals in the general public. See GARDNER & STERN, supra
note 64, at 240-42 (explaining that study results suggest that vivid imagery designed to
induce fear can make problems more available to individuals). At the same time, if the
imagery is too strong it may backfire, leading the recipients to underestimate the
probability of the event. Id. at 242. Organizational effects also may be important. For exam-
ple, the vocabulary of an organization and the opportunities for social interactions may
play a large role in the influence of the human health norm. Studies suggest that in many
settings people desire to put forward their "socially responsible self." AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 13, at 33. Yet the form of discourse may take a very different shape in a firm
than it might in the general public. SeeJAcKALL, supra note 114, at 13-14; see also Andersson
& Bateman, supra note 114, at 565.
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cal literature suggests that to the extent the regulated community
perceives enforcement to be based on insignificant violations, com-
pliance rates may be negatively affected. 121 At the same time, to
increase public disclosure of information about the effects of non-
compliance on human health and the environment, EPA may need
to increase the paperwork requirements for the regulated commu-
nity. A principal feature of many environmental statutes is self-dis-
closure of regulated emissions. 122 Public disclosure of toxic release
data through programs such as the Toxics Release Inventory, a
publicly available compilation of toxic chemical emissions by large
firms, has been hailed as among the most successful environmental
policy innovations of the past two decades.1 23 A result of this em-
phasis on compiling and disclosing emissions, however, is that
much of environmental compliance involves paperwork, and much
of the associated enforcement activity involves paperwork viola-
tions. 1 24 Although the data generated by paperwork requests may
increase the disclosures needed to facilitate internal or external so-
cial control, paperwork violations are difficult to link to human
health or environmental harms, and therefore may generate little
guilt or external social sanctions. An enforcement program based
largely on paperwork violations also may contribute to a culture of
resistance. In short, a reporting requirement that is designed to
increase compliance through increased disclosure of environmen-
tal emissions or violations may decrease compliance by undermin-
ing the norm of law compliance.
1 25
A number of steps may be taken to address this paperwork para-
121. See supra text accompanying note 86.
122. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (2002) (discharge monitoring re-
ports); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2002)
(Toxics Release Inventory reports); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6922 (2002) (hazardous waste manifests); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(k) (2002)
(continuous emission monitoring reports). Interestingly, approximately 96% of all deter-
minations of air emissions by large and small facilities do not involve site-specific direct
measurements. Instead, they involve the use of activity levels and emissions factors to esti-
mate emissions. OFFcE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note
26, at 14.
123. See, e.g., Bradley R. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TR and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 316-23 (2001). The
toxic release reporting requirements were included in the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2002). The Toxics Release Inventory
data may be viewed on the Internet. See U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, Toxics RELEASE INVEN-
TORY, at http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/chemical.htm (last modified July 29, 2002).
124. See Alexander S.P. Pfaff et al., Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of
EPA's Self-Audit Policy (CSRN Working Paper, 2001) (on file with author).
125. This also could be framed as a reduction in the legitimacy of the law. See generally
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dox. Announcements of environmental enforcement actions that
focus on the environmental impacts associated with paperwork vio-
lations, and not simply the paperwork violations themselves, may
prove beneficial. 126 The literature suggests that investing resources
to determine whether a paperwork violation concealed an underly-
ing emissions violation and publicizing that fact may have greater
positive effects on compliance rates than a simple deterrence
model would suggest. 127 Enforcers can seek to distinguish knowing
attempts to withhold information or provide false information
from inadvertent or trivial errors. In addition, environmental
paperwork forms could be modified to communicate the link be-
tween compliance and existing internal norms by demonstrating
the relationship between human health and environmental harms
and environmental paperwork compliance.
3. The norm of environmental protection.
Hypothesis. This norm can be expressed as follows: "An individ-
ual should not harm the environment." The norm may affect plant
managers by causing them to feel guilty when an act that is legal
nevertheless leads to environmental harm. An individual may feel
additional guilt when a violation of an environmental law also leads
to environmental harm. Alternatively, if the manager complies with
the norm of environmental protection (e.g., by avoiding a legal
discharge of a waste chemical to a stream), yet violates an environ-
mental law (e.g., by storing the waste chemical in violation of an-
other statute) and is the subject of an enforcement action, the
environmental protection norm may undermine the manager's de-
sire to comply with the law.
The environmental protection norm is distinct from the human
health norm. Many violations of environmental laws do not have
immediate or calculable human health effects but do have environ-
mental effects. 128 Of course, some environmental violations, such
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv.
683 (1999).
126. EPA officials believe that administrative and paperwork violations often conceal
emissions-related violations. See U.S. GEN. AccouNrING OFFICE, AIR EMISSIONS REPORTING 8
(2001).
127. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 61, at 479-80 (discussing the legitimacy effects
of criminal prosecution of paperwork violations).
128. Ultimately, many environmental harms also will affect human health and wel-
fare. For the purposes of this analysis of activation of the norm of environmental protec-
tion, however, those effects are so attenuated that the harms can be safely treated simply as
environmental effects.
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as releasing toxic chemicals into a water supply system, may lead to
obvious human health effects. In other situations, such as wetlands
destruction, the near-term harm may be inflicted only on the envi-
ronment, and not on human health. In yet other cases, the harm to
both human health and the environment may be substantial and
immediate, but causation may be difficult to determine.1 29
Empirical Studies. Although it is unclear whether information
about environmental harms is as likely to provoke internal or exter-
nal social sanctioning as information about harms to human
health,13 ' the environmental protection norm appears to influence
environmental behavior, at least at the individual level."' 1 The
study of managers in the metal-finishing industry discussed above
concluded that the harmful consequences of emissions to non-
human victims (e.g., wildlife) influence managers' environmental
decision-making. 13 2 Similarly, a survey of residential consumers
concerning energy conservation demonstrated that a belief that re-
ducing electricity use has environmentally beneficial consequences
is one of the factors associated with reduced use at peak hours. 133
At the same time, information about environmental consequences
does not have an effect on all types of energy conservation behav-
ior. A later study suggested that although awareness of the social
and environmental consequences of energy conservation increases
personal curtailment of energy use, it does not influence invest-
ments in energy efficient equipment.3 4 Overall, however, these
129. In fact, many actions may be subject to government regulation rather than com-
mon law torts in large part because of the difficulty of associating a particular act with a
particular victim's injuries. See generally John Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized
Torts, 88 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 2002) (on file with author).
130. See P. Wesley Schultz & Lynnette Zelezny, Values as Predictors of Environmental
Attitudes: Evidence for Consistency Across 14 Countries, 19J. EvrL. PSYCHOL. 255, 257 (1999)
(reviewing studies and concluding that there is "only limited support" for a set of environ-
mental attitudes that are distinct from attitudes about human health or welfare); see also
Denis Collins, Organizational Harm, Legal Condemnation and Stakeholder Retaliation: A Typol-
ogy, Research Agenda, and Application, 8J. Bus. ETHICS 1, 6 (1989) (suggesting that harmful
consequences to human victims will be more influential than other harmful conse-
quences). See generally James Weber, Influences upon Managerial Moral Decision Making: Na-
ture of the Harm and Magnitude of the Consequences, 49 HUM. REL. 1, 12-13 (1996) (concluding
physical harm triggers higher levels of moral reasoning than economic or psychological
harm).
131. See Flannery & May, supra note 107, at 653-54.
132. See id. at 657.
133. SeeJohn Stanley Black, Attitudinal, Normative and Economic Factors in Early Response
to an Energy-Use Field Experiment (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wis-
consin) (on file with University of Wisconsin Library).
134. SeeJ. Stanley Black et al., Personal and Contextual Influences on Household Energy
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studies support the proposition that awareness of environmental
harms, as opposed to human health harms, can activate a norm
and influence behavior.
Implications. A potential implication, as discussed in connection
with the human health norm, is simply that additional information
should be made available regarding the connection between envi-
ronmental enforcement and environmental harms. No empirical
studies suggest that linking enforcement to environmental harms
will produce anything but greater informal social control.
Environmental enforcement interventions also might be able to
tie the environmental protection norm to individuals' desire to ap-
pear socially responsible in group settings. Studies suggest that one
or more individuals in an organization often will adopt a socially
responsible position. When that position is expressed in group set-
tings, others will be unwilling to take an adverse position. As one
review of the compliance literature suggests, often at least one indi-
vidual in a firm will desire to put forward such a posture, and
" [w] hen even only one player with causative responsibility or with a
powerful preventative capability turns, empirical experience shows
that many other actors who had hitherto been ruthlessly exploita-
tive suddenly find a public-regarding self that becomes surprisingly
engaged with a constructive process of righting the wrong."1 35 The
difficulty may involve identifying the individual willing to put for-
ward that posture initially, and taking an enforcement action that
leads that person to act in a way that induces others to act accord-
ingly. Internal investigations of corporate conduct by an outside
law firm at the direction of the board of directors may play this
role. l3 6 Although the investigation process typically takes place af-
ter a significant violation has occurred, it also may have an effect
Adaptations, 70J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 17-18 (1985). The findings of Black and others were
based on a survey of 883 residential electric customers, the results of which were analyzed
using a model that postulated different concrete norms for energy efficiency and use cur-
tailment. Id. The model distinguished between "personal norms" (e.g., a "sense of personal
obligation and pride with respect to insulating the home and getting the same comfort for
less energy," and a "sense of obligation to 'cut back' or to use less heat in winter") and
"social norms" (e.g., a "belief that neighbors take pride in insulating their homes or feel
guilty about using energy inefficiently" or "a belief that neighbors disapprove of overuse of
home heating or cooling."). Id. at 9. The study also supports the proposition that norms
have a greater influence on behaviors that are not economically constrained (e.g., reduc-
ing the temperature setting on a thermostat), than on those that are (e.g., investing in a
new furnace).
135. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 113.
136. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 110; BRENT FiSSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TH4E
IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983).
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on norms that influence prospective compliance. The investigation
and the reports generated may force individuals to confront infor-
mation in settings in which the socially responsible decision is un-
ambiguous and must be made with the knowledge of others in the
group.
Another potential implication is that inspectors should conduct
conferences with a group of decision-makers at the conclusion of
an inspection.1 3 7 For example, inspectors can be trained to take a
"reintegrative shaming" approach to noncompliers 38 Rather than
simply stigmatizing noncompliers (as suggested by a pure deter-
rence model focus) or overlooking violations to generate goodwill
(as suggested by a pure cooperation model focus), studies suggest
that the most effective inspectors use a combination of shame and
trust. These inspectors shame by openly disapproving of poor per-
formance, but remain respectful in their criticism and even praise
evidence of improvement. The result is that the approach shames
but does not stigmatize or ostracize the noncomplier. In one study,
inspectors that followed this approach were found to generate
higher rates of compliance than those who simply stigmatized or
excused violations." 9 This reintegrative shaming could be con-
ducted among relevant managers or owners within the regulated
firm, or through "community accountability conferences" that in-
clude community members outside of the firm. If such conferences
include both recognition of positive steps taken by the regulated
firm and unequivocal, but not stigmatizing, indication of the viola-
tions and the need to come into compliance, long-term compli-
137. Studies of these issues may not only lead to more successful enforcement strate-
gies, but also may explore whether the Schwartz norm activation theory applies only to
norms based on human welfare, or whether it also applies to norms that in some cases are
only indirectly linked to human welfare, such as the norm of environmental protection. See
Riley E. Dunlap & Kent D. Van Liere, Response to Heberlein's Rejoinder, 33J. Soc. IssuEs 211,
212 (1977) (suggesting "constructing two AC scales-awareness of interpersonal conse-
quences and awareness of environmental consequences-and examining their relative im-
pact over time").
138. See Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, Reintegrative Shaming and Compliance with
Regulatory Standards, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 361, 379-80 (1994). Makkai & Braithwaite note that
"[t]he effective inspectors are those who believe in strong expressions of disapproval com-
bined with strong commitments to burying the hatchet once things are fixed, to tempering
disapproval for poor performance on one standard with approval for good performance
on other standards, to avoiding humiliation by communicating disapproval of poor per-
formance within a framework of respect for the performer." Id. at 379. They suggest that
effective nursing home inspectors "catalyze dialogue among highly interdependent peo-
ple-proprietors and managers, managers and staff, staff and residents' committee repre-
sentatives." Id. at 380.
139. Id. at 379.
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ance rates may increase.14 ° Whether such an approach will work for
environmental compliance remains to be seen.
Finally, environmental management systems that require peri-
odic auditing and dissemination of auditing reports, even if only
within a firm, may serve the same function. These systems may trig-
ger internal norms among those who have little to benefit from
noncompliance by making them aware of noncompliance. The pe-
riodic internal reporting also may enable these individuals to exert
social influence during individual and group interactions with
others in the firm. At least one recent study suggests that these
programs may lead to increased environmental compliance.' Of
course, systems that require public disclosure of emissions or com-
pliance status also may harness external community norms.
4. The norm of autonomy.
Hypothesis. This norm can be expressed simply as follows: "An
individual should be left alone unless events suggest that the indi-
vidual has done or will do something morally blameworthy." 14 2 Ex-
amples of the norm in the environmental compliance area include
the common expectation in the business world that in the absence
of blameworthy activity an individual or firm should be free from
government intervention. Violation of the norm of autonomy may
diminish one's attachment to the norm of law compliance. The
autonomy norm also interacts with the norms of procedural fair-
ness, good faith and reciprocity described below, but it is distinct
from them. For example, the autonomy norm is different from the
norm of good faith in that the good faith of a company could be
presumed in an inspection, yet the inspection could be so invasive
that it triggers the autonomy norm.
Empirical Studies. The existence of this norm is supported by sev-
140. Id.
141. See Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How
Does Regulation Matter? (U.C. Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
No. 78) (working paper on file with author). Pressure by large, sophisticated suppliers or
customers also may influence behavior. See Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation,
and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care, 17 LAW & POL'Y 57, 84-86 (1995). Gun-
ningham also has asserted that large chemical manufacturers can influence the behavior of
small, less sophisticated manufacturers. See also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 115.
142. The norm has been characterized in many ways and has been discussed in a
wide range of contexts, but this article only addresses it as it relates to corporate environ-
mental compliance. See, e.g., Marco Verweij, Why is the River Rhine Cleaner than the Great Lakes
(Despite Looser Regulation) , 34 LAw & Soc'v REv. 1007, 1029-30 (2000) (discussing studies of
American values relating to individual freedom or autonomy).
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eral studies of environmental and other behavior. In a review of
pollution control efforts in the United States, Davies and Mazurek
concluded that non-intrusiveness has had a significant and often
overlooked influence on the development and implementation of
environmental requirements. 43 Similarly, a review of changing atti-
tudes toward the environment in the 1970s noted that declines in
support for environmental protection efforts from the early to mid-
1970s were associated with a new awareness of the adverse conse-
quences of environmental protection for personal freedom or au-
tonomy. The study concluded that increases in public recognition
that polluting activities may enhance personal freedom were associ-
ated with decreases in negative views of the human consequences
of pollution."4
The autonomy norm also can be inferred from a wide range of
studies that have noted negative reactions to invasive regulatory in-
spections outside of the environmental arena.145 For example, the
tax literature has identified patterns of behavior that are consistent
with the norm. A study of European enforcement programs con-
cluded that more intrusive programs generated higher compliance
rates than less intrusive programs, but they also generated more ill
will. Yet the optimal balance between intrusiveness and reduced
deterrent effect may be difficult to assess. The same study con-
cluded that systems with weak coercive mechanisms generated a
sense of arbitrariness and insecurity, and of discrepancy between
law and reality.14 6 The principal risk posed by more cooperative,
less sanctioning approaches to environmental enforcement is that
this sense of arbitrariness will become widespread and will nega-
tively affect compliance rates.
Studies also have evaluated whether focusing individuals on
their personal commitments to the autonomy norm affects compli-
ance behavior. For example, studies suggest that when television
programs focus individuals' attention on the existence of the au-
tonomy norm, the individuals demonstrated enhanced commit-
ment to the concept.14 The studies also demonstrated that
143. J. CLARENCE DAVIES &JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES:
EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 169 (1998).
144. See Heberlein, supra note 106, at 210.
145. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 25.
146. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 130.
147. See generally SANDRAJ. BALL-ROKEACH ET AL., THE GREAT AMERICAN VALUES TEST:
INFLUENCING BEHAVIOR AND BELIEF THROUGH TELEVISION (1984); MILTON ROKEACH, THE
NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES (1973); Milton Rokeach, Long-range Experimental Modification of
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individuals have a greater willingness to donate money to groups
that advocate for the concept.148 Individuals also may view others'
intentions to control their behavior as attempts to limit freedom of
action, and they may react by resisting the controls. Inducements
that are perceived as controlling the action of the individual thus
may lead to "reactance" against the threat, reducing internalization
of norms that promote compliance and reducing compliance
rates.' 49 One study suggests that deterrent threats can be viewed as
the sum of a reactance effect and a deterrent effect.15 ° According
to this approach, the greater the perceived importance of auton-
omy, the less likely the individual will respond to threats of formal
legal sanctions by increasing compliance. Instead, when the free-
dom to conduct an activity is very important, individuals may react
to increased threats to restrict that freedom by simply increasing
their commitment to the illegal activity. 5'
Implications. The standard response to concerns about auton-
omy and intrusiveness is to recommend that Congress and EPA
craft legal requirements and enforcement policies in ways that min-
imize the intrusiveness of monitoring and sanctioning programs.
The identification of the autonomy norm suggests a number of ap-
proaches along these lines. For example, if market-based environ-
mental prescriptions lead to increased perceptions of autonomy,
they also may lead to higher compliance levels than other compa-
rable regulations. 52 The norm also suggests that government agen-
Values, Attitudes and Behavior, 26 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 453 (1971); Milton Rokeach, Long-term
Value Change Initiated By Computer Feedback, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 467 (1975).
For an overview of this literature, see Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55.
148. See Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55, at 208.
149. See Ann K. Boggiano et al., Use of the Maximal Operant Principle to Motivate Chil-
dren's Intrinsic Interest, 53J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 866, 866-67 (1987).
150. See SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY
OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 38-54 (1981).
151. John Braithwaite suggests that the appropriate response is to identify those who
do not place great importance on the particular freedom being regulated, and to include
them in restorative justice efforts to change the behavior of the noncomplier. See
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 107.
152. One interesting test of the norm of autonomy and the psychological phenome-
non of reactance that could be conducted in the environmental compliance area would be
to examine variations in compliance rates with regulations that vary in the degree of auton-
omy provided to the regulated party. For example, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
include a novel emissions trading program for acid rain precursors. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-
7 651 (o) (2002). In theory, the program provides regulated firms with far more freedom to
select compliance methods than do many other Clean Air Act programs. Firms are re-
quired to hold emissions allowances for all relevant emissions, but they can (with some
limits) control many variables in the compliance calculus, including the number of emis-
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cies may want to characterize efforts to achieve environmental and
human health gains without government restrictions on emissions
(such as the Toxic Release Inventory disclosure requirements) as
attempts to achieve environmental protection with a minimum im-
pact on autonomy.
In addition to defending against the negative effects of the au-
tonomy norm, regulators also may be able to use the norm offen-
sively. One example is an effort by the State of Texas to harness the
norm in support of a campaign against litter. 153 By turning "Don't
Mess with Texas" into an anti-littering slogan, the state has empha-
sized the aspect of litter prevention that involves individual control
over the quality of the environment, rather than government con-
trol over the individual.154 It is unclear whether similar tactics will
influence corporate environmental compliance, but the empirical
research discussed above suggests that the notion should not easily
be dismissed.
B. Procedural Norms
Studies also have identified the influence of procedural justice
or fairness norms on compliance. These norms are procedural in
the sense that they are associated with the character of the interac-
tions between the enforcing agency and the regulated individual or
sions allowances purchased and the means of achieving emissions equal to those al-
lowances. The means of achieving emissions totals may include end-of-pipe controls,
switching to cleaner-burning fuels and reducing plant operations. Historically, EPA annual
inspections have found violations in 61% of fossil fuel electric plants under the major
environmental statutes. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COM-
PLIANCE ASSURANCE, EPA/310-R-97-007, PROFILE OF THE FOSSIL FUEL ELECTRIC POWER GEN-
ERATION INDUSTRY 125 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publications/assistance/sectors/notebooks/fossil.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2002). In con-
trast, data from continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) indicate that compli-
ance with the acid rain emissions program is greater than 99.9%. See U.S. ENVrL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA/430-R-00-007, ACID RAIN PROGRAM: 1999 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp (last visited Nov. 26, 2002). Although these re-
sults are intriguing, without further data it will not be possible to determine whether this is
a norm effect. The effect could be the result of other aspects of the relevant statutory
schemes. The effect also could be the result of the use of CEMS in the acid rain emissions
program, which raises the visibility of emissions and the likelihood of detection. A compari-
son with compliance rates of other CEMS-measured air emissions would be an important
first study.
153. See Texas Department of Transportation, Don't Mess With Texas, at http://www.
dontmesswithtexas.org/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
154. A series of "Litter Attitudes and Behavior" surveys were conducted as a part of
the "Don't Mess with Texas" campaign. The studies identified factors that induce individu-
als to litter and factors that are most persuasive in discouraging littering. See id.
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firm, rather than the underlying compliance obligations or out-
comes.1 55 Studies suggest that the perceived fairness of interactions
with enforcement agencies affects views about the legitimacy of the
agencies and compliance rates. 15 6 In addition, widespread consis-
tency appears to exist in individuals' norms related to procedural
fairness.' 57 The procedural norms discussed below are the norms
of fair process, good faith and reciprocity. As with the substantive
norms, it is important to resist the tendency to conflate these three
procedural norms with a generalized norm of fair process. The
three norms appear to exert related, but distinct, influences on in-
tentions to comply. They also lead to different prescriptions for
environmental law and enforcement policies.
1. The norm of fair process.
Hypothesis. This norm can be expressed as follows: "An individ-
ual should not be treated arbitrarily or be denied an opportunity to
defend her behavior." Examples of the effect of this norm include
the negative reaction of a plant manager if there are no appeal
rights from a government order or if an order requires remedia-
tion of other firms' wastes. Alternatively, a positive effect may occur
if the agency provides an appeal process. This norm interacts with
the norm of law compliance in that violation of the norm of fair
process may decrease the strength of one's adherence to the norm
of law compliance and the intensity of the guilt felt if the law com-
pliance norm is violated. In addition, acts that deny fair process
also may be perceived as assaults on autonomy. The norm of fair
process relates to the procedures that govern the interactions be-
tween the agencies and the regulated party rather than the imple-
mentation of those procedures, which is the subject of the good
faith and reciprocity norms.
158
Empirical Studies. A number of studies have demonstrated that
many individuals act as though they hold a generalized norm of
155. TYLER, supra note 69, at 6-7. Tyler identifies aspects of "procedural justice" as
including "neutrality, lack of bias, honesty, efforts to be fair, politeness, and respect for
citizens' rights." He concludes that "[a]ll of these potential features of a procedure are
conceptually distinct from its outcome and therefore represent values that may be used to
define procedural fairness in terms not related to outcome." Id at 7.
156. See infra notes 158-67.
157. TYLER, supra note 69, at 7.
158. The norm of fair process concerns issues such as the avenues for disputing an
initial agency enforcement decision, the perceived fairness of the formal legal sanction,
and the ability to seek resolution of contested issues from a disinterested party.
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fairness. 159 In his survey research, Tom Tyler has noted the associa-
tion between perceptions of fair procedures and increased crimi-
nal law compliance. 6 ° He also has demonstrated that people who
perceive that they are treated fairly feel respected and more readily
adhere to other group norms.161 Other studies suggest that fair
process is important not only to individual compliance, but also to
corporate compliance.162
As discussed above, qualitative studies of corporate managers
have suggested that environmental enforcement actions taken
against those who were motivated to comply but failed to do so
because of the complexity of the regulatory regime may trigger a
norm of fair process. No quantitative studies have evaluated
whether environmental enforcement actions in these situations are
associated with changes in the perceptions of fairness or intentions
to comply of corporate managers, or whether these factors are as-
sociated with changes in facility-level or firm-level compliance
rates. Quantitative studies have been conducted in the tax compli-
ance area, however, and they have suggested that perceptions of a
government agency's procedural fairness are associated with
higher compliance. 163 For example, an analysis of the 1987 Tax-
payer Opinion Survey concluded that procedural fairness was one
of two factors associated with increased commitment to compli-
ance by individual taxpayers.' 64 Conversely, the study concluded
that "[a] uthorities' unresponsive, disrespectful, and unfair treat-
ment of taxpayers fosters disrespect for and rebellion against tax
authorities and tax laws."' 65 Studies of college students also suggest
that the perceived fairness of enforcement methods may affect
compliance levels.
166
159. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1135-36 (discussing empirical results
of the "ultimatum game" and related games and concluding that "the evidence suggests
that, for many people, self-interest maximization can be somewhat tempered by the affirm-
ative desire to treat others fairly").
160. TYLER, supra note 69, at 178. For example, increased compliance occurs when an
individual perceives procedural fairness of an enforcing agency or court proceeding. Id. at
161-62.
161. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUSTICE (1988); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCE-
DURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000).
162. SeeYEAGER, supra note 26, at 251-302.
163. Id.
164. See Smith, supra note 68, at 227-29, 246 (concluding that responsive service and a
fair process increased taxpayers' commitment to compliance).
165. Id. at 227.
166. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 120-21.
[Vol. 22:55
2003] TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS IN ENVTL. COMPLIANCE 105
Although deterrence strategies and strategies designed to
strengthen norm-based compliance are "often symbiotic and com-
plementary,"' 67 the procedural fairness findings suggest that deter-
rence-based enforcement can adversely affect perceptions of fair
process and adherence to the norm of law compliance. For exam-
ple, one tax study used survey data to analyze whether deterrence-
based enforcement affected willingness to comply voluntarily.
1 68
The study noted that confidentiality restrictions prevent the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) from publicizing many enforcement
cases but that taxpayers hear about the unfairness of enforcement
from other taxpayers. In addition, taxpayers communicated with
one another more about the fairness of the enforcement contacts
than about the amount of additional taxes paid.1 69 Specific deter-
rence appeared to have occurred, but general deterrence may have
been undermined by perceptions of unfair procedures. The find-
ings emphasize the importance not only of having fair procedures,
but also of how information about fair procedures is
communicated.
Implications. If empirical testing confirms that the findings con-
cerning the fair process norm are applicable to corporate environ-
mental compliance decision-making, several important
implications may follow. At the outset, the existence of fair proce-
dures appears to be an important factor in compliance, and one
not addressed by the standard deterrence model. A less obvious
implication is that publicizing the existence of fair enforcement
procedures also may have a substantial impact on compliance
rates. Patterns of informal communication may explain some
firms' views toward environmental enforcement. For example, "war
stories" exchanged at firm, trade association, professional or other
meetings are a primary means of learning about environmental en-
forcement. In some situations, the limited ability to learn about the
details of public enforcement actions that are based on complex
fact patterns or that occur in distant locations may make bellwether
cases particularly important. These cases may substitute for more
comprehensive and representative information on enforcement. 70
167. Smith, supra note 68, at 247. For a critical review of the Smith study, see Richard
Lempert, Commentary, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 44, at 251.
168. Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of
Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 44, at 259, 262.
169. Id. at 281-82.
170. For a perspective from a Department of justice attorney on the validity of envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement case selection, see Avi Samuel Garbow, The Federal Envi-
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The findings suggest that agencies need to better understand how
information is communicated within the regulated community and
how to exercise enforcement discretion to avoid misleading stories
about bellwether cases.
2. The norm of good faith.
Hypothesis. The norm of good faith can be expressed as follows:
"An individual should be presumed to act in good faith until events
prove otherwise." An example of the effect of this norm is the neg-
ative reaction of a plant manager if a government inspector's atti-
tude during an inspection conveys a presumption that the manager
or firm is a bad actor. As with the other procedural norms, even
when a law is consistent with a human health or environmental
norm, the violation of the norm of good faith may produce a coun-
tervailing resistance to the law or neutralize guilt about noncompli-
ance with it.
The good faith norm is closely related to but distinct from the
norm of fair process. The good faith norm relates more to the
character of the interactions between the enforcing agency and the
regulated firm than to the types of procedures that are in place.
The good faith norm also is distinct from the norm of reciprocity.
The good faith norm influences behavior on first (and, in some
cases, only) interactions, whereas the reciprocity norm is of partic-
ular importance in situations that involve iterative relationships.
Empirical Studies. In the environmental compliance area, the
Bardach and Kagan study included interviews with corporate man-
agers who ascribed reductions in their motivations to comply with
the law to regulators' presumptions regarding the managers' bad
faith.17' Similar findings have been made regarding nursing home
managers. For example, one review of enforcement survey re-
sponses noted nursing home managers' negative reactions to in-
spectors who "always assume the worst." '72 The authors concluded
ronmental Crimes Program: The Lorax and Economics 101, 20 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 47, 49 (2001).
EPA's critics have used perceptions of unfair treatment in a wide range of settings. Several
members of Congress have described EPA as "the Gestapo of government." David W. Case,
The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory
Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2001). Interestingly, studies of Australian nursing home
operators suggest that individuals may perceive enforcers to resemble the Gestapo even
when the enforcers appear to researchers to be even-handed. See Makkai & Braithwaite,
supra note 138, at 377.
171. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 86, at 109-13.
172. AYRES & BRMaTHWAITE, supra note 13, at 25.
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that motivations to comply are undermined by inspectors' assump-
tions that individuals in the regulated community "are driven by
baser motivations."173 An observed pattern of behavior that sug-
gests the existence of the norm in the criminal context is the in-
creased compliance that occurs when an individual perceives that
an officer has listened to the violator's explanation of her con-
duct. 1 7 4 Studies of street crime suggest that those who are given
this opportunity are less likely to commit violations in the future.
1 75
Similarly, the analysis of the 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey dis-
cussed above concluded that responsive service was one of the two
factors that increased citizens' commitment to tax compliance.
176
When tax authorities were perceived to be unresponsive or disre-
spectful, taxpayers demonstrated disrespect for and rebellion
against tax authorities and tax laws.
17 7
Several studies suggest that the good faith norm is likely to in-
fluence not only individual-level compliance, but firm-level compli-
ance as well. Studies of several regulatory compliance areas have
concluded that presuming bad faith in individuals increases the
likelihood that their firms will not comply in the absence of coer-
cion. 178 At the same time, these studies suggest that individual- and
firm-level compliance may increase if the enforcer is able "to sur-
prise the very worst of people by treating them as trustworthy" and
is able to induce them to express a commitment to act in a socially
responsible fashion in a group setting.
179
Implications. Several prescriptions may arise from the norm of
good faith. First, the studies regarding good faith, taken in isola-
tion, have induced cooperation model advocates to suggest various
forms of amnesty for environmental offenders. The framework
proposed here suggests that amnesty programs that are not care-
fully tailored may lead to unintended consequences because of
their effects on the other factors that influence compliance deci-
173. Id. They described this enforcement approach as the "minimal sufficiency prin-
ciple." Id. at 49-50.
174. See Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 138, at 377; see also TYLER, supra note 69, at
161-63.
175. See TYLER, supra note 69, at 91-92.
176. Smith, supra note 68, at 227-29, 246.
177. Id. at 227.
178. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 64-66 (examining research on facility-level
compliance with health care and nuclear energy regulations). Braithwaite asserts that the
research leads to the conclusion that "when we treat people as knaves, they are more likely
to become knaves." Id. at 106.
179. Id. at 120.
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sions 18 0 For example, to the extent compliance decisions are the
product of calculations of the perceived certainty and severity of
the formal legal sanction arising from a violation, amnesty pro-
grams may create a disincentive to comply until an enforcement
action is threatened or initiated. Similarly, those parties that invest
in compliance may react negatively if others do not and are not
penalized. As discussed below, the parties that comply may per-
ceive themselves as "dupes" and their commitment to the law com-
pliance norm may diminish.181
Second, the training for inspectors discussed above should in-
clude information about how to communicate a norm of good
faith while continuing to watch for information suggesting that the
good faith is not genuine-a "trust but verify" approach. Contrary
to the predictions of the deterrence model, the studies that imply
the existence of the good faith norm suggest that if more inspec-
tors are hired and conduct more inspections, but individuals in
regulated firms perceive each of those inspections as unfair, indi-
vidual reactance may counteract the increased deterrent effect,
muting the impact on compliance rates.18 2 Training inspectors to
use the inspection process to trigger norms that promote voluntary
compliance, or at least to avoid triggering norms that discourage
compliance, thus may lead to fewer violations.
3. The norm of reciprocity.
Hypothesis. This norm can be expressed as follows: "An individ-
ual should give benefits to those who have given her benefits." Ex-
180. For example, a blanket amnesty for first-time violators based on a presumption
of good faith may create an uneven playing field regarding the financial costs of compli-
ance. If entities are given a free pass on first offenses, then they may have few incentives,
other than those arising from internal and external norms, to implement regulatory re-
quirements until detected. Those who do implement the requirements may be at a com-
petitive disadvantage. The financial incentives may overwhelm the norms favoring
compliance, especially when combined with the norm of conformity discussed below; and
that may lead to substantial decreases in compliance levels. John Scholz and others have
proposed variants on the tit-for-tat model developed by game theorists that may be used to
address these issues. See John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory
Enforcement, 18 LAW & Soc'v Rav. 179, 219 (1984) (noting that a game theoretic model can
reach an equilibrium at which firms adopt a cooperative strategy with a regulatory agency
using a "tit for tat" approach if the firms anticipate future interactions with the agency); see
also AvREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 21. These scholars suggest that a strategy in
which the agency presumes good faith, is vengeful in the event it detects bad faith, and is
quick to forgive upon a renewed indication of good faith may engender high compliance
levels, even if many entities are motivated principally by pecuniary concerns.
181. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
182. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 105-06 (discussing studies).
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amples of the effect of this norm include the negative reaction of a
plant manager if a particularly difficult or expensive compliant act
is not acknowledged by the enforcing agency. The norm thus inter-
acts with the norm of law compliance in that violation of the norm
of reciprocity may decrease the strength of adherence to the norm
of law compliance. Alternatively, a positive effect may occur if the
enforcing agency provides compliance assistance: the regulator's
act may trigger a sense of obligation to reciprocate by the manag-
ers of the regulated entity. The reciprocity norm is distinct from
the norm of fair process in that it may trigger a perceived obliga-
tion to reciprocate in situations that arise long before any act of
noncompliance occurs. It thus may be activated in situations in
which the fairness of the enforcement process is not at issue.
Empirical Studies. Several studies have examined the norm of
reciprocity. An early qualitative study of reciprocity concluded that
the notion that individuals are obligated to reciprocate was univer-
sal among societies studied."8 3 In surveys and controlled experi-
ments, individuals have demonstrated a sense of obligation to
reciprocate favors.184 One of the leading proponents of the con-
cept of reciprocity, Robert Cialdini, has identified several patterns
of behavior that suggest the existence and strength of the norm.
8 5
For example, Cialdini has noted that the norm of reciprocity un-
derlies the sense of obligation that is created when a charity pro-
vides a potential donor with an unsolicited gift in the mail.
Charities pursue this strategy because gifts trigger a sense of obliga-
tion in individuals to reciprocate with a donation of greater value
than the gift.'8 6 Charities also utilize the norm of reciprocity to in-
duce an individual to select a lesser donation amount after re-
jecting a request for a larger donation. A solicitor working for a
charity will first ask for a large donation; after this request is re-
183. See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity, 25 Am. Soc. REv. 161, 171 (1960)
(reviewing the sociological literature and concluding that a norm of reciprocity is univer-
sal). Gouldner notes the reluctance of sociologists to define reciprocity, but expresses the
moral norm of reciprocity: "You should give benefits to those who give you benefits." Id. at
170 (emphasis in original).
184. See, e.g., Dennis T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on Compliance, 7J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 627, 633 (1971) (concluding from a controlled experiment that
subjects are more likely to comply with a request by a person if the person has done them a
favor).
185. Cialdini describes reciprocity as the norm that "[o]ne should be more willing to
comply with a request to the extent the compliance constitutes a reciprocation of behav-
ior." Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55, at 211.
186. See id. at 211-12.
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jected, the solicitor will suggest a second, substantially smaller
amount. This tactic triggers a sense of obligation in the potential
donor to reciprocate the concession made by the solicitor.187
Procedural fairness by regulators may also trigger norms of reci-
procity.""' The analysis of the 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey con-
cluded that responsive service was one of two factors that increased
citizens' commitment to tax compliance. 18 9 The norm of reciproc-
ity also appears to create a sense of obligation to reciprocate when
concessions are made in negotiations. 9 ° Individuals in regulated
entities may feel more inclined to reciprocate if concessions are
made during negotiations, regardless of the fairness of either the
initial demand or the concession. 191
Implications. The reciprocity norm may suggest a number of pol-
icy prescriptions. Enforcement officials' current approach to many
negotiations, for example, may be missing opportunities to trigger
the reciprocity norm and stimulate future compliance. Concerns
about agency capture and other factors have led to a strong bias
against compromise in enforcement negotiations by deterrence
model advocates. The risk of this approach is that it can lead gov-
ernment negotiators to confuse capture with concessions. 9 2 Reci-
187. See id. at 212.
188. Smith, supra note 68, at 225-26 (noting "the strong tendency for humans to try
to reciprocate, in kind, behaviors directed toward them").
189. Id. at 227-29, 246. It is unclear whether the responsive service triggered a norm
of reciprocity that is distinct from the norms of good faith and fair process. The notion of
reciprocity between the regulated and the regulator can be thought of as an aspect of
procedural fairness, but it is valuable to treat it as a separate norm in part because it may
lead to different prescriptions than a more generalized norm of fair process.
190. See, e.g., Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55, at 212-13.
191. See Robert B. Cialdini & Karen Ascanti, Test of a Concession Procedure for Inducing
Verbal, Behavioral, and Further Compliance with a Request to Give Blood, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
295, 298-99 (1976) (concluding that a sequencing of requests beginning with a request for
an extreme favor regarding blood donation, followed by a request for a smaller favor,
appears to create a perception that a concession was made and is superior to other proce-
dures in producing compliance with the request for a favor); Robert B. Cialdini et al.,
Reciprocal Concessions Procedure for Inducing Compliance: The Door-in-the-Face Technique, 31 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 206, 214 (1975) (concluding that a request for an extreme
favor regarding volunteer services, followed by a request for a small favor generated more
compliance with the request for the small favor than requests for the small favor only, and
suggesting the existence of "a norm requiring that regular concessions be reciprocated");
see also Alan A. Benton et al., Effects of Extremity of Offers and Concession Rate on the Outcomes of
Bargaining, 24J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 82 (1972) (concluding that the person
to whom a concession strategy is applied will feel more responsible for the outcome).
192. In other words, a negotiator may not make concessions out of fear of being
perceived as captive of a regulated entity, even when the government's initial position left
flexibility for concessions.
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procity studies indicate that granting concessions will often trigger
feelings of obligation to reciprocate by the regulated party. This
does not mean that the government should necessarily extract less
in negotiations than it otherwise would, but that enforcement offi-
cials should consider adopting ai initial position in negotiations
that will allow a subsequent concession in order to trigger an obli-
gation to reciprocate. Simply put, although the deterrence model's
focus on formal legal sanctions and concerns about capture may
result in an uncompromising approach, a more nuanced strategy
might generate higher long-term levels of compliance. The short-
term benefit of avoiding a concession in the particular action or
negotiation may be more than offset by the lost opportunity to util-
ize reciprocity to induce future compliance without enforcement
interventions. 
193
The reciprocity norm has other implications as well. The norm
of reciprocity may be triggered by changing environmental permit
application forms so that regulatory obligations are identified up-
front, followed by identification of any regulatory flexibility. 194 In
addition, although federal and state environmental agencies al-
ready look for opportunities to bolster compliance by providing
compliance assistance, 195 reciprocity research suggests that compli-
ance assistance programs in the environmental enforcement arena
may not only increase capacity to comply but also may trigger reci-
procity norms.19 6 Research suggests that EPA may be able to fur-
ther trigger reciprocity norms by engaging in additional
compliance assistance and by further publicizing its compliance as-
sistance efforts. EPA also could emphasize the benefits of its com-
pliance assistance services by stressing how inexpensive their
services are to the firm relative to those purchased through a pri-
vate market. The reciprocity studies suggest that these efforts may
increase compliance far more than the standard deterrence model
would predict. In any event, EPA could test the effectiveness of
193. Smith, supra note 68, at 247. See also Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation
Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 44,
at 259, 262 (using survey data to analyze whether deterrence-based enforcement also nega-
tively affected willingness to comply voluntarily).
194. The prescriptions offered in this paragraph draw on those suggested by Robert
Cialdini for tax compliance. See Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55, at 212-14.
195. See Markell, supra note 24, at 19.
196. See COMM'N FOR ENVrL. COOPERATION, VOLUNTARY MEASURES TO ENSURE ENvi-
RONMENTAL COMPLIANCE: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVES 9 (1998),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/LAWPOLICY/Vol-2eEN.pdf (last visited Oct.
28, 2002).
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these efforts to stimulate compliance and change the attitudes of
affected individuals or entities.
C. The Norm of Conformity
Hypothesis. The norm of conformity can be expressed as follows:
"An individual should act as others do." The existence of this norm
is supported by a wide range of empirical studies, although it is not
typically referred to as a norm. 97 The regulatory compliance litera-
ture has identified at least two patterns of behavior that suggest the
existence of a norm of conformity: (1) perceptions of widespread
noncompliance appear to influence compliance rates; and (2) so-
cial validation also appears to influence compliance rates.
198
Empirical Studies. Numerous studies in the regulatory compli-
ance literature suggest that perceptions of widespread noncompli-
ance undermine compliance. For example, a survey of tax
compliance found that admitted noncompliers are more likely to
assume high levels of public noncompliance, and those who report
their own tax evasion often also report tax evasion by friends and
relatives.199 The exact role of social norms, however, is not clear.
197. The tendency of individuals to conform to the behavior of like others has been
referred to simply as social influence. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 352 (noting that "individ-
uals tend to conform their conduct to that of other individuals"). The norm of conformity
also could be categorized as an epistemic custom. An epistemic custom is a pattern of
behavior that serves as an informational heuristic. An example includes the buying of cer-
tain goods based on brand names. The brand identification that emerges from widespread
adoption of the product serves an informational or heuristic function for the consumer
who is unwilling or unable to research the product's attributes. See Hetcher, supra note 32,
at 56-64. The conformity norm may function in this way. In addition, individuals may inter-
nalize patterns of behavior as ones that not only are commonly followed by others, but
ought to be followed. From the perspective of an evolutionary biologist, receptivity to so-
cial influence could include an instinctive component that may confer an evolutionary
advantage. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altru-
ism, 250 SCIENCE 1665 (1990). The distinction among different terms for what I call the
conformity norm, although ultimately significant, does not affect the conceptual frame-
work presented in this article.
198. See Cialdini et al., supra note 54, at 1015. Cialdini and others also note that a
"descriptive" norm that identifies what type of behavior is typical can be stated thus: "If
everyone is doing it, it must be a sensible thing to do." They suggest that this norm pro-
vides an efficient "decisional shortcut." Id.
199. See Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55, at 215 (noting that "issues of cau-
sality are not unambiguous"). The converse also appears to be true. Recent research in tax
compliance has found the belief that others obey tax laws serves as a heuristic for whether
an individual chooses to comply. See, e.g.,John T. Scholz & Mark Lubbell, Trust and Taxpay-
ing: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 Am. J. POL. Sci. 398, 410 (1998)
(finding a relationship between the belief that most taxpayers at the respondent's income
level pay what they "legally owe" and individual tax compliance).
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The effect of perceptions of widespread noncompliance on inten-
tions to comply in the future may result from the norm of con-
formity, or may simply be the product of a perceived reduction in
the risk of formal or informal sanctions. Regardless of the cause,
enough evidence exists to support further research and, if the role
of the conformity norm is empirically verified, changes in enforce-
ment policies and strategies may be in order.
Furthermore, the deterrence model may overestimate the ef-
fect of an increase in perceived probability of detection on compli-
ance if effects on norms are not taken into account. 200 The survey
of tax compliance discussed above found that having knowledge of
someone who has had difficulties with the IRS decreases the indi-
vidual's perceived probability of detection .201 Beliefs about
whether others are complying appear to be more important to an
individual's decision to comply than the amount of the tax or the
anticipated sanction. Increases in audit rates thus may result in an
increase in noncompliance. 20 2 In addition, "tax gap" stories-news
accounts of the gap between the revenue owed by taxpayers and
the amount collected by the government that include information
about high rates of noncompliance, even if coupled with informa-
tion about increased detection methods-may lead to reduced
compliance. The tax compliance survey discussed above concluded
that highly publicized enforcement actions might perversely signal
that it is relatively easy for taxpayers to get away with evasion.
2 3
The source of this phenomenon and the direction of the causal
arrow are unclear, however. Some types of compliance behaviors
may be responses to general social influences, such as group identi-
fication. 20 4 Dan Kahan and others have discussed the "desire not to
200. Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions
and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 44, at 193, 214
(referring to attitudes). The Sheffrin and Triest study has been discussed by Dan Kahan.
See Kahan, supra note 21, at 354 n.19.
201. Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 200, at 205-06. Sheffrin and Triest conclude that
perceiving others as dishonest significantly increases the likelihood that a person will evade
taxes. Id.
202. See id. at 193, 212-13; see also Marco Steenbergen, Kathleen McGraw & John
Scholz, Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers
Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 44, at 1 (referring to norms as
attitudes).
203. Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 200, at 214 (recommending that the IRS engage in
"broad, 'low profile' enforcement programs, such as computer matching of income reports
and tax returns" rather than targeting a "narrow group of people" through audits or highly
publicized enforcement actions).
204. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 354. Most individuals "loathe being taken advantage
114 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
be suckered. ' 2°5 This effect may explain the relatively high tax
compliance rates in the United States as compared to European
countries. 0 6 Other research echoes the conclusion that coopera-
tion decreases if compliers view themselves as "dupes.
20 7
On a similar note, the tax compliance literature suggests that
individuals seek social validation.2 0 8 In other words, people "fre-
quently use the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of others, particularly
similar others, as a standard of comparison against which to evalu-
ate the correctness of their own beliefs, attitudes, and actions. "209
As a result, individuals are more likely to comply with a require-
ment if similar others are doing so. Examples of the impacts of
social validation include charitable organizations' use of telethons
to create a sense that others in the audience are giving, and the
"salting" of church plates with a small initial contribution before
the plates are passed among church members. Research also shows
that individuals shown lists of prior contributors are more likely to
donate to charity. 210 Yet as with perceptions of widespread non-
compliance, causation is unclear, as is the role of informal social
sanctions.
Implications. Perhaps the most important implication of the
norm of conformity is that certain prescriptions of both the deter-
rence and cooperation models could generate unintended conse-
quences, including reductions in compliance rates. For example,
following the deterrence model, EPA enforcement tactics reflect
the view that "well placed and well publicized" enforcement actions
will increase compliance rates.21' One such federal enforcement
of" and as a result react negatively when they believe that others have refused to comply. Id.
at 358.
205. Kahan, supra note 55, at 604 (quoting Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More
Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 390, 403 n.53 (1994)).
206. Kahan, supra note 21, at 358.
207. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 39, at 945 (citing multiple articles in THE HAND-
BOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995)).
208. Cialdini notes that a social validation principle can be expressed as follows: "Peo-
ple should be willing to comply with a request for specific behavior to the degree that
similar others are or have been performing it." Social Motivations to Comply, supra note 55, at
214.
209. Id. at 213.
210. See id. at 214 (discussing advertising claims that certain products are the "largest
selling").
211. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1219-20 (quoting Cheryl E. Wasserman, An
Overview of Compliance and Enforcement in the United States: Philosophy, Strategies and Manage-
ment Tools, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL ENFORCEMENT 7, 10 (1990)).
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strategy is to publicize major, national consolidated enforcement
actions on a single type of violation or pollutant in order to call
major media attention to the enforcement actions. The media at-
tention is designed to enhance general deterrence. Yet the tax re-
search suggests that in some situations noncompliance may
increase, rather than decrease, following the announcement of a
major enforcement initiative. The tax research suggests that en-
forcement actions may have a negative impact on compliance if the
message received by the regulated community is not that the cer-
tainty and severity of sanctions is high, but that noncompliance is
widespread. Potential noncompliers may react more to the notion
that they are "dupes" than to the intended message of the enforce-
ment announcement that the risk of penalties is high. The tax re-
search at a minimum raises serious doubts about this strategy. To
avoid sending the message that noncompliance is widespread
among similar others, enforcement announcements may achieve
greater success if they focus less on large, high-profile announce-
ments than on broad, low-profile actions. 2 1 2 If high-profile an-
nouncements are necessary for reasons unrelated to informal
social regulation (e.g., to maintain congressional or public support
for enforcement), the message may need careful scripting to con-
vey the notion that compliance is widespread, that the rare in-
stances of noncompliance occur among dissimilar others, and that
the noncompliance will likely lead to detection and large formal
and informal sanctions.
One way to generate more accurate perceptions of widespread
compliance is to expand programs that facilitate and reward the
conduct of Good Samaritans. 2 "3 EPA and state governments have
embarked on a wide range of Good Samaritan programs designed
to increase compliance rates. One of the earliest and best known
was EPA's Leadership Program. 214 EPA conducted a pilot study of
the Leadership Program with twelve companies and two federal fa-
cilities as the first participants. The Leadership Program, like many
212. See, e.g., Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 200, at 214 (suggesting "broad, 'low-profile'
enforcement programs").
213. Ellickson has noted the potential value of Good Samaritans to the efficacy of
norms in closely-knit groups. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 210-11.
214. The Environmental Leadership Program has been reconstituted as the National
Environmental Performance Track. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PERFORMANCE TRACK (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack (last
visited Oct. 26,(2002). The over-compliance requirement is also a feature of other EPA
recognition. programs. For a thorough discussion of these programs, see Case, supra note
170, at 39-59.
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similar federal and state programs, sought to reward only those
companies that exceeded compliance. This over-compliance crite-
rion has been the subject of debate. The requirement ensures that
the program does not reward regulated entities simply for doing
what they are legally obligated to do, but an unintended result of
rewarding over-compliance is that membership is limited to a small
subgroup of the regulated community. Studies on the social influ-
ence of perceived compliance rates suggest that the addition of a
new type of recognition program may lead to higher general com-
pliance levels. A program that rewards regulated entities for com-
pliance, rather than over-compliance, with environmental
regulatory requirements could include a much broader group of
companies. Publicizing the existence of the large membership
could reinforce the perception of widespread compliance.
The research findings also suggest several additional implica-
tions for corporate environmental compliance. Since publicity re-
garding high compliance rates may be as important to stimulating
compliance as publicity about large sanctions for violators, EPA
may wish to publicize survey results showing that most regulated
entities comply and that most people (either in the general public
or in a specific subpopulation) view noncompliance as violating
widely held norms.215 EPA should craft environmental enforce-
ment announcements to convey the message that most firms com-
ply with environmental laws and that "similar others" comply. As to
those who do get caught, EPA should take pains to portray them as
different from others in the regulated community.
Research also suggests a vulnerability in the pure form of the
cooperation model: in some situations, small reductions in the
threat of formal sanctions can cause compliance rates to plum-
met.2 16 These effects appear to arise if the reductions in the threat
of formal sanctions lead to a perception of widespread noncompli-
ance. If that perception exists, individuals may conclude that the
compliance incentives are so out of line with a rational calculus of
the costs and benefits of compliance that compliance is foolish. Co-
operation-based enforcement programs thus run the risk of in-
creasing noncompliance by creating perceptions of widespread
noncompliance. The absence of a floor of deterrence may lead not
215. For an example of this type of approach in the tax literature, see Social Motiva-
tions to Comply, supra note 55, at 215. For a discussion of environmental compliance rates,
see infra text accompanying notes 254-58.
216. See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 200, at 214.
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just to small declines in compliance, but to tipping points beyond
which noncompliance will be rampant.217 As a result, it may be im-
portant to identify those tipping points and to employ sufficient
deterrence-based enforcement mechanisms to avoid them. Testing
the hypotheses suggested here will be an important step in that
direction.
IV. TESTING THE PREDICTIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The environmental compliance literature can be divided into
two categories: quantitative analyses of the effects of enforcement
actions on facility- or firm-level compliance, and qualitative studies
of the factors and processes that affect individual managers' deci-
sion-making.218 The former provide quantitatively defensible re-
sults but do not explore the influence of norms on individual
decision-making. The latter provide insights into managers' deci-
sion-making processes but do not provide quantitative evaluations
of the relationship between managers' decision-making and facil-
ity- or firm-level compliance. These two lines of inquiry have added
substantially to our understanding of environmental compliance
behavior. Yet they also have left a gap: neither has examined the
relationship between social influences on managers' decision-mak-
ing and facility- or firm-level compliance. Thus, although there are
strong indications that internal and external norms influence com-
pliance, no published quantitative studies have examined the
linkage between actual, facility- or firm-level compliance rates and
the internal and external norm influences on corporate environ-
mental decision-makers. Policymakers are left to speculate about
the extent and direction of the normative influences on
compliance.
The conceptual framework outlined above is designed to help
bridge that gap. The framework suggests that formal legal sanc-
tions, internal norm sanctions and external norm sanctions all in-
217. See supra text accompanying notes 204-07. For a popular discussion of the tip-
ping point, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000).
218. For an example of a quantitative study, see Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi,
Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33J.L.
& ECON. 331, 354 (1990). For examples of "thick" qualitative studies, see generally
BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 86; JACKALL, supra note 114. For a description of thick stud-
ies, see CLIFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 30 (1973)
(observing that "thick" qualitative studies are those based on extensive information gather-
ing on the motivations of each individual by the researcher, as opposed to quantitative,
"thin" studies in which individuals' motivations are not examined in detail).
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fluence the environmental compliance decisions of corporate
managers. If the framework is to add to the predictive capacity of
the standard deterrence model, however, formal legal sanctions,
internal norm sanctions and external norm sanctions all must ex-
ert a meaningful influence on corporate environmental compli-
ance at the level of the facility or the firm.
This Part examines the empirical support for this proposition.
It begins by assessing the standard deterrence model prediction
that increases in the certainty and severity of formal legal sanctions
will increase compliance. It then examines the question of whether
empirical studies support the hypothesis that internal and external
norm sanctions also influence compliance. It closes by examining
the reasons for the gap in the environmental compliance literature
and the potential bridging role of the framework presented here.
A. The Standard Deterrence Model
The standard deterrence model posits that increases in the per-
ceived likelihood of detection and severity of sanction should in-
crease compliance.219 Compliance is presumed to be intentional,
either directly or through the allocation of resources necessary to
eliminate stochastic noncompliance. 220 The individual or firm is
expected to comply only when the costs of noncompliance are
higher than the benefits.
2 21
219. See Becker, supra note 19, at 176 (concluding that, in the various theories about
the determinants of criminal offenses, "when other variables are held constant, an increase
in a person's probability of conviction or punishment if convicted would generally de-
crease, perhaps substantially, perhaps negligibly, the number of offenses he commits").
Corporate criminal compliance may be expected to more closely resemble the rational
economic actor posited by the standard deterrence model. See, e.g., John Braithwaite &
Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 292,
302 (1982) (concluding that deterrence is more likely to be effective with corporate crime
than with street crime because "[c]orporate crimes are almost never crimes of passion;
they are not spontaneous or emotional, but calculated risks taken by rational actors").
220. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,246.
221. For a firm, the monetary benefits of noncompliance can be substantial and may
include the costs avoided by not installing and operating pollution control equipment or
by not remediating past contamination. For an individual, the monetary benefits of non-
compliance also may be substantial and may include items such as bonuses and promo-
tions for meeting financial targets. See, e.g., Cohen & Simpson, supra note 31, at 47; A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and
Probability of Fines, 35J.L. & ECON. 133 (1992). A wide range of factors may complicate the
analysis. For example, perceptions of the likelihood of detection or the severity of the
sanction upon conviction may be unrealistic. Several studies have examined the perceived,
as opposed to actual, likelihood of detection and severity of sanctions. See, e.g., Paternoster
& Simpson, supra note 63, at 555-56. The threat of sanctions may be complicated by gov-
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Given the immense environmental and economic conse-
quences of corporate environmental compliance rates, the empiri-
cal support for these propositions is remarkably scarce.2 2 2
Empirical studies can be conducted at any of several levels of analy-
sis ranging from the individual to the facility, the firm, or an indus-
try sector. The vast majority of the environmental studies have
focused on facility-level compliance. I begin by examining these
studies, and follow up with an examination of studies of individual-
level compliance.
Not surprisingly, the environmental studies have focused on a
limited number of areas in which data were readily available, most
notably oil transport operations and the pulp and paper indus-
try.223 Some studies focus on environmental compliance, while
others examine environmental performance. The former refers to
compliance with environmental laws, and the latter refers to actual
levels of emissions, not whether those emissions are in compliance
with environmental laws.224 On the whole, the results are similar
for both facility- and individual-level environmental behavior: in-
creases in monitoring lead to increases in compliance and per-
formance, but increases in sanctions have limited effect.
ernment enforcement strategies. Agencies may engage in tit-for-tat or "bad actor" strate-
gies, in which enforcement agencies "leverage" resources by targeting them at repeat
offenders. Studies of the standard model have sought to account for these strategies. See,
e.g., Winston Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB. ECON.
29 (1988) (proposing a dynamic repeated game model); Paul Downing &James N. Kim-
ball, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws in the U.S., I1 J. POL'Y STUD. 55, 59-60 (1982); see also
Jon D. Harford, Measurement Error and State-Dependent Pollution Control Enforcement, 21 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 67 (1991).
222. See Cohen, supra note 19, at 78 (noting that until recently there have been "sur-
prisingly few" empirical studies of environmental enforcement and compliance); Cohen,
supra note 14, at 10,245; Michael, supra note 14, at 537 (finding a "lack of significant com-
bined empirical-theoretical research in the areas of policy implementation and enforce-
ment"); Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1205 (concluding that "there is little in the way of
empirical evidence that can be used in deciding which enforcement techniques [based on
deterrence or cooperation] are most likely to achieve regulatory goals").
223. For extensive reviews of this literature, see generally Cohen, supra note 14; Co-
hen, supra note 19. For OSHA compliance, see Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 95. See
also Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587 (1996); Christen Carlson White, Regulation of Leaky Underground
Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'v 105, 151-53
(1995/96).
224. For an examination of both compliance and performance, see Magat & Viscusi,
supra note 218, at 334-39 (analyzing Clean Water Act compliance and emissions). For an
examination of environmental performance but not compliance, see generally Shameek
Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know
Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997) (discussing Toxics Release
Inventory emissions).
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1. Likelihood of detection.
A number of studies indicate that increases in the likelihood of
punishment, such as those achieved through increased govern-
ment monitoring, increase facility-level compliance and perform-
ance.225 In a leading study, Mark Cohen concluded that increased
monitoring by the Coast Guard appeared to have a general deter-
rent effect at the facility level on the volume and frequency of oil
spills arising from oil transfer operations.2 2 6 Studies in the pulp
and paper industry also have demonstrated that government moni-
toring has a specific deterrent effect at the facility level. For exam-
ple, Wesley Magat and Kip Viscusi reviewed compliance in the U.S.
pulp and paper industry and concluded that every inspection re-
sulted in: (1) fewer facilities failing to comply with mandatory emis-
sions reporting requirements; (2) a reduction in levels of biological
oxygen demand, an important indicator of effluent water quality;
and (3) a reduction in noncompliance with permit effluent limits
and reporting requirements. 227 Similar conclusions have been
reached in subsequent studies of pulp and paper mill compli-
ance,228 as well as studies of facility-level compliance with a wide
range of civil and criminal laws, including nursing home regula-
tions and mine safety regulations.
229
Although improved environmental compliance and perform-
225. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,245.
226. Id. at 10,246 ("To date there is no evidence that government-imposed penalties
have any deterrent effect on oil spills.").
227. Magat & Viscusi, supra note 218, at 354, 359.
228. See Benoit Laplante & Paul Rilstone, Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the
Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 19, 35 (1996) (finding that
the expected inspection rate is a significant explanatory variable for compliance rates);
Louis W. Nadeau, EPA Effectiveness at Reducing the Duration of Plant-Level Noncompliance, 34 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 54, 76 (1997) (finding that a 10% increase in monitoring activity is
associated with a 0.6% to 4.2% reduction in violation time, and a 10% increase in enforce-
ment is associated with a 4.0 to 4.7% reduction in violation time).
229. See, e.g.,John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corpo-
rate Deterrence, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 7, 8 (1991) (reviewing studies and concluding that
"[t]hey have shown very little support for an effect of the perceived severity of sanctions on
compliance but reasonable support for the hypothesis that the perceived certainty of pun-
ishment increases compliance with the law"). Braithwaite and Makkai also note that quali-
tative fieldwork suggests that corporate managers may overestimate the probability of
detection and punishment. Id. at 16 (finding such overestimation among nursing home
managers). Studies of inspections conducted by the Mine Safety and Health Administra-
tion have found that a 25% increase in inspections was associated with a reduction in
fatalities ranging from 7 to 20%, even though the average penalty for a successful citation
was only $173. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 63 (citingJOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH
OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 3 (1985)).
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ance has often been associated with an increased likelihood of de-
tection, the observed effects of the increased monitoring have
been limited. Several studies have found only limited decreases in
environmental emissions or limited increases in compliance associ-
ated with increases in government monitoring.230 One study ex-
amined Coast Guard enforcement of oil spill regulations and
concluded that a ten percent increase in monitoring at the facility
level resulted in just over a three percent reduction in the volume
of accidental oil spills. 23' Studies of the effects of enforcement ac-
tivities on the number of oil spills, 232 on the amount of pulp and
paper mill emissions,233 and on compliance with Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) requirements234 have reached simi-
lar conclusions. Taken together, the facility-level studies suggest
that large increases in government monitoring may be necessary to
generate meaningful increases in environmental performance or
compliance. Increasing monitoring is costly, however, and the in-
trusiveness and political backlash generated by increased monitor-
ing may make monitoring strategies difficult to sustain. 23 5
No studies have explored how changes in the perceived likeli-
230. Cohen & Simpson, supra note 31, at 43 (noting that "prior empirical studies of
corporations have been able to explain only a small percentage of the variation in crime
rates").
231. Dennis Epple & Michael Visscher, Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence,
Detection and Deterrence, 27 J.L. & ECON. 29, 46 (1984). Epple and Visscher also estimated
that a 10% increase in monitoring led to a 2.1% increase in spills detected, suggesting that
the increased detections arising from increased monitoring was greater than any deterrent
effect of the increased monitoring itself. Id at 54.
232. See Eric E. Anderson & Wayne K. Talley, The Oil Spill Size of Tanker and Barge
Accidents: Determinants and Policy Implications, 71 LAND ECON. 216, 227 (1995) (examining
oil transport operations and concluding that Coast Guard pollution detection activity is
effective at the margin in reducing size of accidental spills); Montserrat Viladrich-Grau &
Theodore Groves, The Oil Spill Process: The Effect Of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills, 10
ENvTL. RESOURCE ECON. 315 (1997) (finding that enforcement activity has a larger effect
on the frequency of oil spills than on the size of oil spills).
233. Magat & Viscusi, supra note 218, at 352 (concluding that each inspection re-
sulted in a 20% decrease in mean biological oxygen demand, indicating improved environ-
mental performance).
234. John T. Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A Be-
havioral Approach to Risk Assessment, 3J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283, 301 (1990) (concluding
that a 10% increase in OSHA inspection frequency generated a 1.5% reduction in work-
place injuries); W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation 1973-
1983, 17 RANDJ. ECON. 567, 575 (1986) (concluding that a 10% increase in OSHA enforce-
ment activity generated a 2% improvement in injury rate). Studies conducted during the
late 1970s and early 1980s found that the average penalty for an OSHA violation was $37.
See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 63.
235. See, e.g., YEAGER, supra note 26, at 37 (noting the budget constraints on EPA
enforcement).
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hood of detection affect actual environmental compliance deci-
sions at the individual level. One study has examined whether
increases in the perceived likelihood of detection are associated
with self-reported behavioral intentions regarding environmental
compliance. The study included environmental compliance as one
of four vignettes in an examination of corporate crime. It found
that when "moral inhibitions" were weak, increased likelihood of
detection was among the variables observed to constrain noncom-
pliance.2 6 The findings of the extensive tax literature on the effect
of increased monitoring on individual compliance are generally
consistent with those of the one environmental study.237
In short, the studies demonstrate that increased monitoring
leads to increased compliance at the facility level. Increased moni-
toring may have the same effect at the individual level, but no
linkage has been established between increased inspections, indi-
vidual intentions to comply, and actual facility- or firm-level com-
pliance. In addition, the facility-level studies suggest that large
increases in monitoring are necessary to achieve small increases in
compliance. A central impediment for policymakers, therefore, is
the limited financial and political capital available for the large in-
creases in inspections and other monitoring activities that would
be needed to increase compliance. 218 So long as monitoring is ex-
pensive for the government and intrusive for the regulated com-
munity, fiscal and political constraints on enforcement activity will
limit the extent to which government may increase monitoring or
sanctions to improve compliance rates. These activities may entail
higher fiscal and political costs than can reasonably be expected to
236. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 63, at 549, 570 (referring to internal norm
effects as "moral inhibitions" and the sense of "personal shame" that would accompany the
commission of the act). See also Cohen & Simpson, supra note 31, at 47 (examining the
constraining effects of legal and informal sanctions and concluding that, "[f]or the most
part, these effects are most salient when directed at the individual, not the firm").
237. Many of the empirical tax compliance studies support the deterrent effect of
increasing the likelihood of detection. See Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra
note 69, at 71. Experiencing an audit, if the audit was conducted fairly and discovered all
noncompliance, may increase future compliance by the audited taxpayer, although the
results are not clear. Id. at 71, 93-94. One review concluded that studies of deterrence-
based enforcement approaches suggest that increasing the probability of sanctions for non-
compliance increases anticipated compliance with the law. Kinsey, supra note 168, at 260,
273.
238. See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1214 (discussing the limited financial
resources of the EPA).
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be secured or sustained by agencies at the federal and state level. 23 9
In addition, the attempt to maintain or increase inspection rates in
the future may resemble an attempt to chase a mechanical rabbit,
as the regulated universe is expected to become more numerous
and diverse in the future.2 4 °
Including norms in the conceptual framework may help ex-
plain the finding that increased inspections are associated with in-
creased compliance. Inspections and detection may trigger
internal and external norm sanctions that are at least as influential
as formal legal sanctions. 24 1 For example, if detection of a violation
triggers the norm of law compliance, internal sanctions may occur
immediately, as may an increase, in perceived risk of external social
sanctions. The norm of law compliance (and the norms of human
health and environmental protection, to the extent they are impli-
cated by the violation) thus may lead individuals to develop more
compliant behavioral intentions immediately upon detection. The
risk to the environmental manager need not be that a notice of
violation will become front-page news in the local newspaper and
will lead to external social sanctions; knowledge of the likely discov-
ery of the violation or interactions with the inspector may suffice to
trigger internal norm sanctions.2 4 2
The norms of good faith and autonomy also may explain why
increasing the likelihood of detection may have only a limited ef-
fect on compliance. If the monitoring process violates these proce-
dural norms, the reduced motivations to comply may equal or
exceed the deterrent effects. For example, if inspectors presume
bad faith in managers, managers may get a message that the en-
forcement agency presumes bad faith, and that the good faith of
the entity did not substantially affect the behavior of the enforcing
agency.243 Increases in inspections thus may have a positive effect
239. See Spence, supra note 13, at 978 (noting the threat to the regulatory system's
legitimacy that aggressive enforcement may pose).
240. See COMM'N FOR ENVrL. COOPERATION, supra note 196, at 8.
241. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 229, at 8 (concluding that "[t]he de-
terrence literature demonstrates a much stronger effect of perceived informal sanctions
(such as family disapproval) on compliance than of formal sanctions").
242. Inspections may include "exit conferences" and other interactions between the
inspector and groups or individuals within the firm that may enhance the internal and
external norm sanctioning opportunities. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 63.
243. The Bardach and Kagan findings regarding a "culture of resistance" thus may be
thought of as arising from violation of the good faith norm. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra
note 86, at 112-16; see also Spence, supra note 13, at 985-96 (discussing the legitimacy effects
of complexity).
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on the perceived likelihood of detection but a negative effect on
intentions to comply. Empirical research has not yet explored
these types of interactions among environmental enforcement in-
terventions, norms, and regulatory compliance decisions.
2. Severity of the sanction.
Given the high cost of government monitoring, policymakers
over the last two decades predictably have resorted to increasing
the penalties for environmental noncompliance rather than focus-
ing on detection. Some empirical evidence supports the general
notion that environmental enforcement programs that focus sub-
stantially on sanctions are more effective than those that do not.
Several quantitative empirical studies of the relative efficacy of
sanction-focused and cooperation- or compliance-focused ap-
proaches have been published. Most have concluded that environ-
mental compliance is higher in regulatory programs that
emphasize a punitive or deterrence-oriented approach to enforce-
ment,244 although one found a cooperation-oriented approach to
be more effective. 45
244. Three studies that examined the relative effectiveness of deterrence-based and
cooperation-based approaches found deterrence-based enforcement programs to be asso-
ciated with higher levels of compliance. The first, which compared pulp and paper mill
compliance in Canada and the United States, found that compliance rates were signifi-
cantly lower for the pulp and paper industry in Canada than for the same industry in the
United States. The study concluded that enforcement in the United States relies on more
of a deterrence-based approach and that the lower compliance rates in Canada cast doubt
on the efficacy of the more cooperative Canadian regulatory approaches. Kathryn Harri-
son, Is Cooperation the Answer? Canadian Environmental Enforcement in Comparative Context, 14
J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 221, 240 (1995). Two other studies examined the enforcement of
erosion and sedimentation control programs. One explored the use of various enforce-
ment techniques in the implementation of a single state's program. The program was im-
plemented by the state in some counties and by local governments in others. The state
enforcement focused on deterrence, and the local government enforcement focused on
compliance assistance. The authors concluded that deterrence-based approaches were the
most successful for simple prescriptive standards, and a combination of deterrence-based
and compliance assistance-based approaches was more successful for complex perform-
ance standards. Raymond J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, Improving Compliance with State
Environmental Regulations, 12 J. PoL'v ANAL. & MGMT. 753, 767 (1993). A related study com-
pared "coercive" and "cooperative" approaches in the urban erosion and sedimentation
control programs across twenty states. The study placed the enforcement authority into
three groups: strong coercion, moderate coercion, and weak cooperation. Administrators
were surveyed regarding the perceived efficacy of the enforcement programs. The study
concluded that programs that lacked a strong deterrent approach were perceived to be less
effective. RaymondJ. Burby, Coercive v. Cooperative Pollution Control: Comparative Study of State
Programs to Reduce Erosion and Sedimentation Pollution in Urban Areas, 19 ENVrL. MGMT. 359,
368 (1995).
245. The study that reached a different conclusion examined industrial wastewater
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Nevertheless, the extent to which increases in the magnitude of
formal legal sanctions influence environmental compliance is un-
clear. Facility-level studies that have examined increases in the se-
verity of sanctions have generally found little or no effect on
facility-level environmental compliance, at least until a threshold
level of monitoring is achieved. For example, in his review of stud-
ies of oil transfer operations, Cohen concluded that the magnitude
of penalties did not have a measurable effect on oil spill size or
frequency.24 6 Comparable findings have been made in studies of
facility-level compliance with other environmental regulations,
247
and in studies of facility-level compliance with regulations in a wide
range of other areas, such as nursing home248 and worker safety
regulations.
249
The individual-level studies are consistent with the facility-level
studies and may suggest why facility-level studies have found that
the magnitude of formal legal sanctions has little or no effect on
compliance. For example, studies of individual-level tax compli-
ance have concluded that the severity of the penalty is less of a
deterrent than the probability of detection. 2 ° These studies sug-
gest that to the extent the size of the sanction is influential, the
emissions of toxic chemicals into the Rhine and the Great Lakes. See generally Verweij, supra
note 142. The limited availability of comparable data on industrial wastewater emissions of
toxics, however, complicated the analysis. For example, one aspect of the study compared
actual emissions data from the sources of Great Lakes toxic chemicals with estimates of
Rhine River source emissions derived from ambient, not source, data. Id. at 1013. Although
almost no studies have been conducted among programs within the United States to deter-
mine whether (and at what level) increasing compliance assistance activities while reduc-
ing deterrence activities will lead to overall increases or decreases in environmental
compliance, one recent study has raised questions about the relative efficacy of punitive
versus cooperative programs. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1205 (asserting that the
argument that greater compliance arises from cooperative approaches is "unconvincing"
and "largely untested").
246. Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,246 (concluding that "[t]o date, there is no evidence
that government-imposed penalties have any deterrent effect on oil spills").
247. Id. at 10,252.
248. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 229, at 8 (concluding that studies on
self-reported juvenile delinquency or tax compliance "have shown very little support for an
effect of the perceived severity of sanctions on compliance but reasonable support for the
hypothesis that the perceived certainty of punishment increases compliance with the law").
249. At least two studies of mine safety have found no association between safety im-
provement and the magnitude of legal sanctions. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 63
(citing studies).
250. DickJ. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax
Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAxEs, supra note 44,
at 291, 291-92. Erard found that taxpayers improve compliance in the years following a
large audit assessment, although this effect depends on an assumption that individuals
targeted for a prior year audit were otherwise more likely to file noncompliant returns.
126 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
influence is observed only after the probability of detection has ex-
ceeded a minimum threshold.251
The individual-level vignette study discussed above concluded
that formal legal sanctions were among.the variables that may con-
strain environmental noncompliance, but only when moral inhibi-
tions or internal norms were weak.252 The conceptual framework
presented here may further explain why increases in sanctions ap-
pear to have a limited effect on compliance. For example, the ef-
fects of informal social sanctions arising from the law compliance,
human health and environmental protection norms may over-
whelm the effects of changes in the size of formal legal sanctions.
Detection of noncompliance may trigger these informal social
sanctions, making changes in formal legal sanctions less influential.
The norms of good faith and fair process suggest additional rea-
sons why increasing the severity of the sanction may have little or
no effect on compliance: if the nature of the regulated individual's
interactions with enforcement officials violates the norms, the re-
duced motivations to comply may equal or exceed the deterrent
effects of increased sanctions. For example, if the managers of a
regulated entity are motivated to comply with a law that is ex-
tremely complex, they may perceive that an aggressive enforce-
ment penalty violates the norm of good faith. Individuals in the
regulated firm may perceive that the enforcement agency
presumes bad faith, and that their good faith efforts to understand
and comply with the law did not substantially affect their treatment
by the agency.
3. Levels of compliance.
The deterrence model predicts that when the certainty and se-
verity of sanctions are very low, so too will be compliance. Inspec-
tion rates for many environmental programs are in fact extremely
low, making detection and thus sanctions unlikely. For example,
EPA recently stated that it and the states conduct as many as
168,000 inspections in an active year, yet it estimates that there may
be more than eight million regulated entities. 253 The number of
Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES,
supra note 44, at 95, 113-14.
251. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 72, 110-11.
252. See, e.g., Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 63, at 549.
253. See U.S. ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 6, at 8. The GAO, using a more expan-
sive definition, recently placed the number of regulated entities at forty-one million. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMAN CAPITAL: IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTVE WORKFORCE STRAT-
[Vol. 22:55
2003] TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS IN ENVTL. COMPLIANCE 127
large emissions sources is quite a bit smaller, perhaps 700,000 facil-
ities, and the targeting of enforcement activities may substantially
increase the inspection frequency for many of the largest or most
recalcitrant emissions sources.25 4 Nevertheless, official inspection
rates for many sources are remarkably low.
In addition, even with increases in statutorily authorized penal-
ties over the last two decades, the mean and median fines actually
levied on violators are also quite low. For example, in 1995 the
median administrative fine imposed by EPA was approximately
$4,000.255 Thus, even if the largest emissions sources are subject to
higher than average inspection rates, the small size of the fines sug-
gests they will have a limited deterrent effect.
Despite the small risks of inspections and the small size of sanc-
tions, compliance rates are widely regarded to be higher than pre-
dicted by the standard deterrence model. 256 This is a necessarily
rough conclusion for many reasons. A wide range of estimates are
available for both inspection rates and mean or median size of pen-
alties, perceived risks may exceed actual risks, and the compliance
calculus for any one decision requires consideration of the per-
EGY WOULD HELP EPA ACHIEW ITS STRATEGIC GOALS 22 (2001). The Environmental Coun-
cil of the States has reported that 1.75 million sites were regulated by the states in 1999, of
which 501,000 were inspected and 449,000 were subject to additional compliance evalua-
tions. ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 13 (2001). In addition, the percentage of violations that
result in sanctions and the size of the sanctions are disputed. See, e.g., Steve Cook, Budget,
Staffing Cuts May Harm EPA Enforcement, GAO Report Says, 32 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1686, 1687
(Aug. 24, 2001) (quoting an environmentalist for the assertion that although states con-
duct 90% of the inspections of regulated entities, they collect only 15% to 30% of the
penalties).
254. One estimate suggests that EPA regulates over 700,000 facilities. Eric S. Schaef-
fer, Encouraging Voluntary Compliance Without Compromising Enforcement: EPA's 1995 Auditing
Policy, in I PROCEEDINGS: FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLI-
ANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 451, 453 (Chiang Mai, Thailand, 1996). The GAO has reported
that inspection rates for regulated major sources under the Clean Air Act in EPA's regions
range from a low of 27% per year to a high of 80%. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 126, at 19. See also CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS
37-43 (1986) (discussing infrequent monitoring and small fines of many state and local
environmental enforcement programs in the United States).
255. See Kelly Kristen Lear, An Empirical Examination of EPA Administrative Penalties 17
(Kelley School of Business Working Paper, 1998). The average penalty was $10,181 and the
maximum was $125,000. Id. at 16.
256. Cohen concludes that although there is some disagreement about the actual
environmental compliance rates in the United States, the "stylized fact" is that compliance
rates exceed the rates that would be anticipated given the relative infrequent monitoring
and low penalties levied for noncompliance. Cohen, supra note 19, at 47 n.6.
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ceived cost of compliance. 257 Together, these considerations cast
doubt on any single prediction of the overall level of compliance
using the deterrence model. Nevertheless, observed compliance
seems surprisingly high given the low certainty and severity of
sanctions.
The tax compliance literature is remarkably consistent with the
environmental compliance literature on this point. There is wide-
spread agreement that tax compliance in the United States is
higher than the standard deterrence model would predict.258 As
with environmental compliance, the probability of detection and
the size of the formal legal sanction are low in the tax area.259 Nev-
ertheless, a 1992 estimate concluded that eighty-three percent of
the total tax liability was collected despite the low risks of detection
and even lower risks of penalties.26 ° In addition, this level of com-
pliance does not appear to be a short-term phenomenon-the pro-
portion of taxes owed that remain unpaid each year has remained
roughly constant from 1973 to 1992.261
As with the other anomalies in the deterrence model predic-
257. See, e.g., Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, The Limits of the Economic Analysis of
Regulation: An Empirical Case and A Case for Empiricism 15 LAw & POL'Y 271, 279 (1993)
(concluding that the actual cost of compliance only explained 19% of the variance in the
expected cost of compliance).
258. See, e.g., Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 200, at 193; Andreoni et al., supra note 68,
at 821 (concluding that "[tiaking information reporting into account, taxpayers still ap-
pear to be more honest than might be expected").
259. Tax audit rates are quite low. They have varied from 4.8% to 0.8% between 1965
and 1995. Andreoni et al., supra note 68, at 820. In addition, penalties are not imposed in
the great majority of cases. One recent literature review concluded that only 4.1% of au-
dited returns resulted in a penalty. Id. at 821. One possible explanation for the higher than
anticipated tax compliance rates is that perceived detection rates are more important that
actual ones. Although studies suggest that individuals overestimate their chance of being
detected, there is a strong association between moral commitment to comply and overesti-
mates of the likelihood of detection. Id at 846. It is unclear which direction the causation
arrow points, or if there is one. Id. at 845. In addition, studies suggest that the transaction
costs (in monetary terms and guilt) of an audit also can be substantial, leading some tax-
payers to over-comply to avoid triggering an audit. Id at 833.
260. See Andreoni et al., supra note 68, at 819.
261. A 1992 estimate concluded that approximately 17% of the total tax liability was
not collected and put the cost of that foregone collection at $95 billion annually. Id. The
"tax gap" studies that have been noted by the social norms theorists in the legal literature
were conducted because of the substantial size of the gap between compliance and non-
compliance. As with environmental noncompliance, even relatively low levels of tax non-
compliance, when aggregated across a vast number of regulated entities, can have
substantial negative effects. An estimate by the IRS of the cost of noncompliance with tax
laws by corporations and individuals in 1987 was $84.9 billion, or roughly 20% of the total
tax liability. Joel Slemrod, Why People Pay Taxes: Introduction, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES,
supra note 44, at 1.
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tions, the social norms included in the conceptual framework may
be at work. For example, the internal and external effects of the
law compliance norm, either alone or in combination with other
norms, may help explain the surprisingly high levels of observed
environmental law compliance. In an oft-cited observation, Chester
Bowles, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration
during the Second World War, asserted that twenty percent of the
regulated community will automatically comply with any regulation
just because it is the law, five percent will seek to evade the regula-
tion, and the remaining seventy-five percent will comply as long as
they believe that the evading five percent will be caught and pun-
ished.26 2 A recent study provides empirical confirmation of a divi-
sion along these lines in at least one group of regulated firms.2 65 A
plausible hypothesis is that the existence of these compliance
groups is a reflection of differences in the norms of firm owners or
managers.
B. Internal Norms
Norms appear to provide plausible explanations for a number
of the anomalies detected in tests of the standard deterrence
model's predictions, but do studies support these norm-based ex-
planations? Have internal norms and external norms been demon-
strated to affect environmental compliance levels at the individual,
facility or firm levels? The next two Subparts examine the data on
internal and external norms.
1. Environmental studies.
At the outset, no published quantitative study has examined the
262. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 86, at 65 (citing CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO
KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIc LIFE, 1941-1969 25 (1971)). The Bowles observation has been
cited in many sources. See, e.g., AvRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 26; Michael, supra
note 14, at 537 (noting that "the depth and breadth of modern federal regulation and
limits on federal resources make it increasingly difficult to find that evasive five percent"
and that "[b]ecause of this difficulty, the cooperation of the vast majority is put in jeop-
ardy"); John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of
Deterrence Theory, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 262 (1997). The approach offered by Eric
Posner in his recent examination of the tax compliance literature is consistent with the
Bowles quote as well. Borrowing an image used by Larry Langdon, former Commissioner
of the IRS Large and Midsize Business Division, Posner suggests that the regulated commu-
nity consists of a mainstream or white hat community, a marginal or gray hat community
and a deviant or black hat community. See Posner, supra note 48, at 1795-97.
263. See Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 88, at 206 (noting similar compliance
groups among nursing homes).
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relationship between the internal norms of corporate environmen-
tal decision-makers and actual facility-level environmental compli-
ance. 264 Several quantitative studies provide initial indications,
however, that internal norms may affect individual- or facility-level
environmental compliance. Two studies have used vignettes re-
garding environmental emissions to examine the self-reported be-
havioral intentions of current or potential business managers.
Neither study examined the relationship between internal norms
and actual individual-, facility- or firm-level environmental compli-
ance, but the studies do provide an indication of how the surveyed
individuals' intentions to comply correlate with internal norms.
The first study, conducted by Raymond Paternoster and Sally
Simpson, included environmental compliance as one of four vi-
gnettes in a study of corporate crime. The study surveyed current
business managers and business students.265 It found that formal
legal sanctions and external social sanctions constrained noncom-
pliance, but internal norm effects had the greatest influence. 26 6
The study concluded that when moral inhibitions were weak, for-
mal and informal sanctions and organizational context affected de-
terrence, but when individuals' moral inhibitions were high,
"consideration of the cost and benefit of corporate crime was virtu-
ally superfluous.
267
The second study, conducted by Brenda Flannery and Douglas
May, surveyed managers of metal finishing firms. The study ex-
amined the managers' responses to questions based on vignettes
regarding hazardous wastewater treatment. 268 The study concluded
that cost, internal norms and external norms all affected the behav-
ioral intentions of the managers, although the effects of internal
norms were weak.269
A third study in the environmental area, conducted by Mark
264. This is not surprising given that most of the quantitative empirical studies that
have evaluated the deterrence model have been influential but have not examined motiva-
tions to comply. For an exception, see generally Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 229
(examining nursing home compliance).
265. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 63, at 571 (noting that moral beliefs have a
strong inhibitory effect on behavioral intentions).
266. Id. at 549, 570 (referring to internal norm effects as "moral inhibitions" and
describing the sense of "personal shame" that would accompany the commission of the
act).
267. Id. at 549.
268. Flannery & May, supra note 107, at 643.
269. Id. at 653 (concluding that costs, external norms and internal norms all "signifi-
candy contributed to explained variance in managers' decision intentions").
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Cordano and Irene Frieze, did not review environmental compli-
ance directly but explored the intentions of business managers to
undertake voluntary corporate pollution prevention activities.
27 °
The study suggested that internal norms are closely associated with
the intention of an individual manager to conduct pro-environ-
mental behavior in a firm. The authors predicted that environmen-
tal managers' internal norms about pollution prevention would
positively relate to their preference to implement source reduction
activities. The results suggest that, among the several factors con-
sidered in the study, internal norms yield the strongest relationship
with behavioral preferences for pollution prevention activity.2 71
A number of qualitative studies also have examined the influ-
ences on individual decision-making processes of corporate manag-
ers. These studies indicate that although internal norms may
influence compliance, the influence does not always lead to in-
creased compliance. A substantial anti-environmental sentiment
among business managers may subvert, rather than support, com-
pliance. The Bardach and Kagan study concluded that regulatory
unreasonableness contributed to a culture of resistance among
business managers.272 A 1988 study likewise concluded that the or-
ganizational climate in corporations limited the influence of busi-
ness managers' moral concerns on regulatory compliance decision-
270. Mark Cordano & Irene Hanson Frieze, Pollution Reduction Preferences of U.S. Envi-
ronmental Managers: Applying Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior, 43 AcAD. OF MGMT. J. 627
(2000) (referring to internal norms as attitudes).
271. Environmental managers' assessments of external norms about environmental
regulation (called "subjective norms" in the study) were positively correlated to their pref-
erence to implement source reduction activities. Id. at 636. Cordano and Frieze found
attitudes or internal norms supporting pollution prevention to be widespread among envi-
ronmental managers in corporations. Id. at 635. These internal norms yielded the strong-
est relationship with behavioral preferences for source reduction activity, consistent with
other tests of the theory of planned behavior. These internal social norms, however, did
not correspond to corporate behavior. Not surprisingly, the study suggests that internal
norms may not lead directly to corporate behavior. Instead, barriers may be formed by
external social norms in the organization, or by financial, technological or other con-
straints on capacity to comply. See Cordano & Frieze, supra note 270, at 636. Internal norms
or attitudes also have been found to influence recycling by individuals. See Carlson, supra
note 98, at 1281-85 (reviewing studies). Carlson concludes that the studies on recycling
demonstrate that "norm internalization matters in predicting compliance with a norm for
high-effort behavior: the stronger one believes in a norm the more effort she will exert." Id.
at 1299.
272. See BARDAcH & KAGAN, supra note 86, at 112-19. In addition, a study of Clean
Water Act enforcement activities in the 1970s and 1980s concluded that norms of environ-
mental law compliance were overwhelmed by other, anti-environmental norm influences.
SeeYEAGER, supra note 26, at 251-96.
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making. 273 Similarly, a review of water quality enforcement in the
United Kingdom concluded that the internal norms of business
managers, as well as the public, regarding compliance with envi-
ronmental and economic regulations were more ambivalent than
those concerning violations of many other laws.274 The bulk of the
qualitative studies are more than a decade old, however, and a
more current examination of corporate managers' norms regard-
ing the environment is needed to assess whether the earlier find-
ings remain valid.
2. Studies of other regulatory areas.
Additional studies of internal norms have been conducted re-
garding compliance with criminal, nursing home, tax and other
laws. Several studies suggest a significant role for internal norms in
the compliance-related decision-making of business managers and
behavior at the facility or firm level. For example, a study involving
interviews of retired middle managers found that the middle man-
agers believed that top management behavior, rather than finan-
cial pressure, was the principal influence on ethical behavior by
firms. 27 5 Similarly, a review of the literature containing interviews
of corporate managers noted that managers believe that they are
motivated by informal social obligations in addition to economic
considerations. 276 A study of corporate criminal behavior con-
cluded that internal norms of law compliance inhibited offending
decisions, regardless of the social cost accompanying commitment
of the act. 27 7 Likewise, a study of corporate managers concluded
that negative publicity triggered both internal and external norm
effects. As to internal norm effects, it found that the impact of neg-
ative publicity on the managers' self-esteem was a more effective
deterrent than formal sanctions.278
273. SeeJACKALL, supra note 114, at 101-33.
274. HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 204 (noting that "offenses against regulation have not
been culturally absorbed and do not invite the same condemnation as breaches of the
traditional code; except when hazardous behavior is the result of negligent or deliberate
misconduct").
275. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT 53 (1983).
276. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 21-30.
277. See Lori Ellis & Sally S. Simpson, Informal Sanction Threats and Corporate Crime:
Additive Versus Multiplicative Models, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 399 (1995).
278. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 136, at 317-21. A 1992 study of corporate man-
agers' criminal compliance reached similar conclusions. Sally S. Simpson, Corporate Crime
Deterrence and Corporate Control Policies: Views from the Inside, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME RECON-
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Studies of nursing home managers in Australia concluded that
the severity of legal sanctions did not predict nursing home regula-
tory compliance, and the certainty of detection did so only to a
limited extent.279 Participation in a subculture of resistance that
undermined the legitimacy of the standards, however, was associ-
ated with noncompliance, and moral beliefs in the regulations
were associated with compliance. 28 ' Nursing home managers who
expressed a belief that those responsible for meeting compliance
standards should feel guilty for noncompliance generally scored
higher on compliance.28 1
Studies of tax compliance also support these findings at the in-
dividual level. 212 An early study employed questions designed to fo-
SIDERED 289, 299 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992). Braithwaite has asserted that
"[s] ociety gets more protection from the habit-forming value of law than from its deterrent
value." John T. Braithwaite, The Limits of Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Conduct,
16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 481, 489 (1981-82). See also Harold G. Grasmick & RobertJ. Bursik,
Jr., Conscience, Significant Others and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 837, 853-54 (1990) (finding that self-imposed feelings of shame had a strongly
deterrent effect for drunk driving, tax cheating, and petty theft); TYLER, supra note 69, at
60 (concluding on the basis of a survey of randomly selected Chicago citizens that "the
most important incremental contribution is made by personal morality").
279. See Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 229, at 35 (finding "little support for the
additive or multiplicative effects of the certainty of detection, the certainty of punishment,
and the severity of punishment," and concluding that only the effect of state-level [as op-
posed to federal-level] certainty of detections "gives some hope that the deterrence doc-
trine is not a total irrelevance in this domain").
280. See Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 88, at 213 (noting that the differences were
observed in government-generated data, not in self-reported data on compliance, and sug-
gesting that those who resist compliance give themselves higher compliance ratings than
government inspectors). Note that in an analysis using panel data, Makkai and Braithwaite
did not confirm the belief in standards but did uncover a significant "guilt" effect. See Toni
Makkai &John Braithwaite, The Dialectics of Corporate Deterrence, 31J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
347, 358 (1994).
281. See Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 280, at 360-61.
282. See Andreoni et al., supra note 68, at 822 (surveying the literature and finding
some deterrent effect from tax enforcement, but noting that "the magnitude of the effect
is uncertain"). The tax literature includes an extensive review of internal norms. Roth and
coworkers define commitment to obey the law as "the individual's perceived moral obliga-
tion to obey, based on internalized beliefs and attitudes." Panel on Taxpayer Compliance
Research, supra note 69, at 118. A recent tax survey may have detected a change in internal
norms regarding tax compliance that coincides with decreases in deterrence-based en-
forcement by the IRS over the last several years. See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX
OVERSIGHT BoARD, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (Executive Summary) Table ES-1 (2002) (noting
that between 1999 and 2001 the percentage of survey respondents who think it is "not at
all" acceptable to cheat on income taxes decreased from 87% to 76%). One older survey
found little or no effect from deterrence on all but the taxpayers most likely to comply. See
Hessing et al., supra note 250, at 304; see alsoJ.C. Baldry, Tax Evasion is Not a Gamble: A
Report on Two Experiments, 22 ECON. LETTERS 333, 335 (1986) (concluding that the decision
to evade taxes was influenced by external norms and internal norms ("moral costs") as well
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cus the taxpayer on either deterrence (the prospect of being
audited or punished) or on the taxpayer's internal norms of law
compliance. 283 The authors concluded that appeals to internal
norms appeared to increase compliance levels, but threats of for-
mal sanctions had little or no impact on compliance levels. 8 4 A
more recent tax compliance study concluded that the standard le-
gal deterrence model of tax compliance can better explain the em-
pirical findings if variables are added to account for non-pecuniary
costs, including an "honesty characteristic" (which roughly corre-
sponds to the notion of an internal norm) and interdependence
among taxpayers (a potential external norm effect) .285 The study
concluded that accounting for non-pecuniary costs in this way im-
proved the explanatory value of the standard deterrence model.286
Overall, the quantitative tax compliance studies are remarkably
consistent with the other studies of regulatory compliance, sug-
gesting that internal norms may have a substantial influence on
environmental compliance as well.
On the whole, the quantitative and qualitative studies that have
examined motivations to comply suggest that internal norms are
likely to influence both individual managers' decision-making and
facility- or firm-level environmental compliance. In fact, among in-
ternal norm sanctions, external social sanctions and formal legal
sanctions, internal norm sanctions have been identified as the most
influential in several regulatory compliance areas.2 87 Initial re
as expected economic returns). Shapiro and Rabinowitz have noted that if a manager has
internalized a general duty to obey the law or specific norm related to health and safety
rules (because of training), the norm might stimulate compliance; but the effect of such
norms may be weakened by the mixed messages society sends about who is responsible for
protecting workers. Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 130.
283. See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
274, 299-300 (1966/67) (describing internal norms as "social commitment").
284. See id.; see also Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 79
(discussing methodological weaknesses in the Schwartz and Orleans study).
285. James P.F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax
Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON. REv. 797, 797-98 (1989).
286. Id. The study examined an internal norm effect: the non-pecuniary cost arising
from private stigma (anxiety, guilt or a reduction in self-image) that may be suffered upon
detection.
287. Grasmick and Scott found that guilt is the strongest sanction of the three Wrong
factors, followed by social sanctions and legal sanctions. Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J.
Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 227 (1982). See also Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 138, at 377
(nursing home compliance); Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at
120 (tax compliance). High moral commitment to obeying tax laws increases self-disclo-
sure to researchers of tax evasion, but it is not clear whether these individuals actually are
[Vol. 22:55
2003] TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS IN ENVTL. COMPLIANCE 135
search suggests that this finding also may hold true for environ-
mental compliance; thus internal norms may be the most
important aspect of informal social regulation for environmental
compliance.2 8
C. External Norms
Studies have suggested that external social sanctions also may
influence environmental noncompliance and environmental per-
formance, but again the studies typically have not combined facil-
ity- or firm-level quantitative assessments of environmental
behavior with surveys of changes in individual managers' norms. As
a result, when viewed in the aggregate the studies are suggestive
but not conclusive. For example, stock values appear to decline fol-
lowing disclosure of information about releases of hazardous
materials that may lead to enforcement actions. 28 9 EPA announce-
ments of environmental enforcement actions, the filing of private
cost recovery actions under the Superfund statute,29 0 and worker
health and safety enforcement actions also have affected stock val-
ues.29 1 But it is unclear whether the stock price declines exceed the
amount of the expected penalties. In other words, the stock price
changes may simply reflect the cost of the environmental liability,
not an additional external norm effect.
292
more compliant. See Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 73. The tax
studies that demonstrate the role of moral commitment are subject to a number of meth-
odological weaknesses, including the role of self-deception (e.g., respondents who agree
with the statement that "[i]t is okay to claim an undeserved deduction when you are not
really sure what the rule is"). Id. at 122. Roth and coworkers conclude that "although the
small number of studies and problems associated with each leave many questions unan-
swered, the overall weight of the evidence supports the basic hypothesis that commitment
plays a significant role in explaining tax compliance behavior." Id. at 123.
288. See, e.g., Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 63, at 568, 581.
289. See Benoit Laplante & Paul Lanoie, The Market Response to Environmental Incidents
in Canada: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 60 S. ECON. J. 657, 657 (1994).
290. See Mary E. Barth & Maureen F. McNichols, Estimation and Market Valuation of
Environmental Liabilities Relating to Superfund Sites, 32 J. Accr. Ras. 177, 205 (Supp. 1994)
(concluding that publicly traded firms' market value reflects future Superfund liability);
Michael I. Muoghalu et al., Hazardous Waste Lawsuits, Stockholder Returns and Deterrence, 57 S.
ECON. J. 357, 365 (1990) (concluding that Superfund cost recovery actions affect market
value).
291. See Clifford L. Fry & Insup Lee, OSHA Sanctions and the Value of the Firm, 24 FIN.
REv. 599 (1989) (concluding that OSHA actions affect market value).
292. SeeJonathan M. Karpoff et al., Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and Repu-
tation Costs 24 (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 071, Oct. 1999), availa-
ble at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). Reputation costs
of actual final determinations of sanctions may not be significant, but an adverse impact on
the market value of companies may still occur at the time of the announcement of the
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Several other studies of corporate environmental compliance
appear to have identified external norm effects. A study of a com-
bined enforcement and public disclosure campaign by the British
Columbia environmental authority found that an increased threat
of formal legal sanctions reduced the environmental emissions of
the regulated pulp and paper plants, but public disclosure created
"additional and strong incentives for pollution control. ' 293 An inno-
vative program in Indonesia also suggests that external social
norms may influence facility-level environmental performance.
214
The Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating
(PROPER) initiative grouped facilities into one of five categories
based on the facilities' compliance and environmental perform-
ance. The categories were color-coded (e.g., the best were in the
gold category) to facilitate easy public interpretation of the facili-
ties' status. The list was then publicly announced. A subsequent
examination of facility performance suggests that many moved up
in the rankings. The risk of detection and severity sanctions re-
mained very small throughout the study period, and enforcement
policy did not change during the period, suggesting that the behav-
ioral changes were not the result of a perceived increase in the
likelihood or severity of formal legal sanctions.295 Facility managers
were not surveyed regarding the factors that influenced their deci-
sion-making, however, so it is unclear whether the changes were
the product of fear of informal social sanctions or of concern
action against them, and the adverse impact may correlate closely to the claimed damages
or penalties. Id. at 10. For a discussion of the impacts of environmental information on
consumer purchasing decisions, see Menell, supra note 101, at 1435.
293. Foulon et al., supra note 99, at 31 (noting the influence of public disclosure on
pulp mills in British Columbia) (emphasis in original).
294. See generally Afsah et al., supra note 99 (explaining the influence of an facility-
ranking disclosure initiative on Indonesian industrial facilities). See also Sheoli Pargal &
David Wheeler, Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from
Indonesia, 104J. POL. ECON. 1314 (1996); Sheoli Pargal et al., Formal and Informal Regulation
of Industrial Pollution: Comparative Evidence from Indonesia and the United States (World Bank
Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 1797, 1997); Tom Tietenberg & David
Wheeler, Empowering the Community: Information Strategies for Pollution Control (paper
presented at Frontiers of Environmental Economics Conference, Airlie House, Virginia,
Oct. 1998).
295. David Wheeler, Information in Pollution Management: The New Model, in WORLD
BANK, BRAZIL: MANAGING POLLUTION PROBLEMS 15 (1997) (explaining that the number of
firms in two of the top PROPER categories increased from sixty-six to ninety-nine and that
the ratings may educate facility owners regarding the environmental status of their plants,
in addition to creating informal external social pressure for better environmental
performance).
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about changes in the perceived value of the company by capital
markets or other factors.
External norm effects can be inferred from several other stud-
ies of corporate environmental compliance. For example, a study
of an EPA voluntary toxic emissions reduction program found that
participating firms were more likely than non-participants to be-
long to industry sectors with consumer contact. 296 Other studies
have been conducted on the Toxics Release Inventory, the publicly
available compilation of toxic chemical emissions by large firms dis-
cussed earlier in this article. Firms are required to report emissions
that exceed threshold amounts, even if those emissions are legal.297
Studies suggest that news stories generated by the initial release of
the Toxics Release Inventory data to the public had a negative im-
pact on the stock value of publicly traded firms that reported sub-
stantial releases. 298 In addition, a study of firm behavior following
release of the data concluded that those firms with the largest neg-
ative returns reduced their emissions more than other firms.299 An
296. See, e.g., Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Envi-
ronmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program, 72 LAND ECON.
413, 426 (1996) (finding that firms that participated in an EPA voluntary toxics reduction
program were more likely to be in industries with greater consumer contact, using advertis-
ing expenditures as a proxy for consumer contact).
297. For a brief explanation of the Toxics Release Inventory, see supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
298. James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics
Release Inventory Data, 28J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 108 (1995) (finding in an analysis of
436 public companies that the first public announcement of the Toxics Release Inventory
data in 1989 was associated with abnormal (negative) returns of 0.3% on the day of public
release of the data, amounting to an average of $4.1 million per firm). Hamilton attributed
the abnormal negative returns to unanticipated news regarding increased pollution con-
trol costs. For reviews of the literature on the impact of information on environmental
compliance and emissions, see Cohen, supra note 14, at 10,250; David W. Case, The Law
and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,773 (2001).
299. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Commu-
nity Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 123 (1997)
(finding in an analysis of the forty firms with the largest abnormal negative stock returns in
1989 as a result of the Toxics Release Inventory data that these firms reduced their Toxics
Release Inventory emissions more than other firms in their industry sectors and had a
lower likelihood of government fines in later years); see also Walter G. Blacconiere & W.
Dana Northcut, Environmental Information and Market Reactions to Environmental Legislation,
12 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 149, 177 (1997). But see Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release
Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection, 36J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 245
(1998) (concluding, in a study of chemical industry firms over the period of 1990 to 1994,
that negative stock returns following the disclosure of Toxics Release Inventory data had a
significant effect on the amount of wastes transferred off-site and a negligible impact on
the total amounts of toxic wastes generated by the firms).
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analysis of the environmental reputation effects on large firms of
securities disclosures of environmental lawsuits and Toxics Release
Inventory data concluded that disclosures regarding even legally
emitted toxic chemicals had a significant effect on the intangible
asset value of publicly traded companies, with the average intangi-
ble asset value loss approaching $380 million.300 Anecdotal infor-
mation suggests that in the United States, community groups use
public disclosure of toxic emissions data to exert social pressure on
facilities and firms. Until combined quantitative and qualitative
studies are conducted, however, it will not be possible to assess the
link between changes in individual-, facility- or firm-level environ-
mental behavior and the norms of individual decision-makers.
30 1
The Cordano and Frieze pollution prevention study discussed
above also identified a potential external norm effect on individual
environmental managers. The study found that environmental
managers' internal norms were positively correlated with their atti-
tude toward implementing pollution prevention activities, but
those attitudes did not correspond to corporate actions.30 2 Al-
though the environmental managers' internal norms supported
pollution prevention, they did not feel external social pressure
from other business managers to conduct pollution prevention.
The study results may suggest that pecuniary considerations pre-
vailed in decision-making or that the pro-environmental internal
norms held by the environmental managers were counteracted by
the external norm influences of others in their firms.
30 3
In addition, several of the studies discussed above in connec-
tion with internal norms detected external norm effects. For exam-
ple, the study of the impact of adverse publicity on corporate
managers found that the managers' social relationships were an
important deterrent to noncompliance, more so than formal sanc-
300. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Does the Market Value Environmental Perform-
ance?, 83 REv. ECON. & STAT. 281, 287-89 (2001) (analyzing the environmental reputation
effects on 321 of the S&P 500 firms based on securities disclosures of environmental law-
suits and Toxics Relese Inventory releases and finding that the average intangible-asset
value loss from bad environmental performance was $380 million, or nine percent of the
replacement value of the assets).
301. For example, the effects may not arise from external social regulation, but
rather from changes in perceptions about the efficiency of the firms' operations, or in-
creased risks of enforcement inspections or tort liability. For a discussion of the use of
Toxics Release Inventory information in informal social regulation, see Karkkainen, supra
note 123, at 316-23.
302. See Cordano & Frieze, supra note 270, at 636.
303. Id.
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tions °4 The studies of nursing home managers also concluded
that managers were more deterred by external norm effects than
by formal legal sanctions. The external norm effects included the
influence of a subculture of resistance, which undermined the le-
gitimacy of the regulatory requirement." 5 The study concluded
that accounting for interdependence in this way improved the ex-
planatory value of the standard deterrence model.3 °6
D. Future Research
In sum, environmental enforcement and the debate about its
future have proceeded largely without defensible empirical results
regarding the relationships among the norms relevant to environ-
mental compliance, the impact of enforcement approaches on
those norms, and actual facility- or firm-level compliance. This re-
search gap results in part from the challenge of gathering and ana-
lyzing environmental compliance data, but several recent
developments suggest that this challenge may not be as great as it
once was. 0 7 Following the reorganization of EPA's enforcement
304. See FiSSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 136, at 279.
305. SeeJohn Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Criminological Theories and Regulatory Compli-
ance, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 191, 213 (1991).
306. The tax literature suggests that external social norms are influential, at least at
the individual level. See Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Research, supra note 69, at 112.
Informal external social sanctions may affect tax compliance in several ways, but given the
extent of the legal norms literature on the impact of external norms on tax compliance,
the empirical research base regarding those effects is surprisingly thin. One indication of
the role of external norms is that voluntary compliance is associated with whether a per-
son's friends or acquaintances are noncompliant. Id. Several studies conclude that taxpay-
ers who have non-compliant friends report less compliance themselves. This phenomenon
could arise from the norm of conformity, perceptions about the likelihood of getting
caught, a social signal that a particular law is unimportant, the desire not to be a "sucker,"
or other causes. Id. at 31. The strength of the inference and the relative roles of formal and
informal sanctions in this process are the subject of substantial dispute. See, e.g., Grasmick
& Green, supra note 15, at 328. A study of whether individuals express future intentions not
to comply suggests that there is such a relationship. Panel on Taxpayer Compliance Re-
search, supra note 69, at 113. The studies in this area should be approached cautiously,
however, because of potential erroneous self-reporting. Id. One tax study found that, in
determining compliance rates, the economic burden of the tax was less important than
one's acquaintances. Steenbergen et al., supra note 202, at 29-30, 32. Based on interviews
with taxpayers, the study's authors concluded that the social influence arising from discus-
sions of taxes influenced the taxpayers' internal norms and their compliance rates. Simi-
larly, Gordon concluded that the standard deterrence model of tax compliance can better
explain the empirical findings if variables are added to account for non-pecuniary costs,
including an internal norm effect and external reputation damage suffered upon detec-
tion. See Gordon, supra note 285, at 798.
307. See Cohen, supra note 19, at 44-45 (noting the difficulty of conducting enforce-
ment research and the recent growth in data availability). In addition, many academic
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program in 1993 and 1994, EPA has placed a new emphasis on
measuring the extent and nature of its enforcement activities and
on evaluating the extent to which enforcement efforts and compli-
ance assistance programs stimulate changes in environmental per-
formance. °8 EPA also has begun to make new facility-level
compliance data publicly available, enabling researchers to ex-
amine the effects of enforcement on different business sectors.
30 9
In June 2001, the National Academy of Public Administration
strongly endorsed additional research on the impacts of enforce-
ment on environmental conditions in an effort to better target en-
forcement efforts toward human health and environmental
risks.310
The increased availability of compliance data alone will not
solve the problem. The research gap also stems from an equally
daunting challenge-the difficulty of conducting interdisciplinary
research. Many of the quantitative studies of environmental com-
pliance have been conducted by economists and others who tradi-
tionally have not focused on norms and related social influences
on individual decision-making. Many of the qualitative studies have
been conducted by sociologists or social psychologists who tradi-
tionally have not focused on relating qualitative findings to quanti-
tative measures of facility- or firm-level performance.
The fact that these two areas of research generally have re-
mained ships passing in the night is more than an intellectual curi-
osity. If social science researchers do not generate defensible
empirical studies of the relationship between formal legal sanc-
tions, internal norms, external norms and compliance, the predic-
tive powers of the deterrence model are unlikely to be improved.
In the absence of such improvements, the debate among policy-
makers is likely to continue swinging between unproven empirical
assertions regarding the effectiveness of various enforcement tech-
niques, and scarce enforcement resources will be wasted on inef-
fective or even counterproductive programs.
studies focus on the making of law, rather than its enforcement. See, e.g., Farber, supra note
14, at 322-23.
308. See Markell, supra note 24, at 7-8. See generallyJon D. Silberman, Does Environmen-
tal Deterrence Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to Understand How and Why,
30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,523, 10,523 (2000).
309. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTEGRATED DATA FOR ENFORCEMENT ANALY-
sis, available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/planning/data/multimedia/idea/index.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
310. NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 115, at 36.
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In recent years, a number of social scientists have begun to use
quantitative techniques to explore the role of norms in compliance
with several regulatory schemes, but the relationship between so-
cial norms and environmental compliance remains largely unex-
plored. The time is ripe for more complete and rapid progress in
this area. Direction for this research effort can be found in recent
developments in social norms scholarship among economists and
lawyers, and in recent studies by sociologists and social
psychologists. 11
The conceptual framework proposed here takes an important
step in the development of the research agenda for this work. It
proposes a typology of potentially influential norms and accounts
for some of the ways in which enforcement interventions may af-
fect the norms and the interactions among them. The interactions
among the norms may be complex, but testing the effect of differ-
ent enforcement interventions on the intensity or different lexical
orderings of these norms among corporate environmental deci-
sion-makers and the individuals who influence their behavior may
lead to more accurate predictions of compliance behavior and
more effective enforcement prescriptions.
V. CONCLUSION
The environmental enforcement debate has been vigorous, but
it has not led to anything close to a consensus on the appropriate
mix of enforcement strategies. Instead, like debates over many
other environmental issues, the enforcement debate has swung be-
tween two options-deterrence and cooperation-that are unnec-
essarily and unwisely regarded as mutually exclusive. That dynamic
is reflected in and perpetuated by existing research, which often
frames the basic decision about enforcement prescriptions as a
choice between the approaches supported by either the deterrence
311. To have influence in the policy-making process, the environmental enforcement
research will need to bridge the gap between the quantitative economic studies and the
qualitative sociology studies that have been conducted to date. The research will need to
be based on a research design that both generates defensible, quantitative results and fo-
cuses on understanding motivations to comply. Research into the effect of social norms on
environmental compliance could be conducted in several ways. As discussed above, the
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) has recently identified the need to
develop data and methodologies that will allow enforcement to be evaluated in terms of its
environmental impacts. The effort suggested by NAPA could be broadened to look at not
only the impact of environmental information on the evaluation of enforcement perform-
ance, but also the effect of environmental information and enforcement interventions gen-
erally on the informal social norms that may play a large role in compliance.
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model or the cooperation model. 12 In particular, the debate has
led to calls for research on whether formal legal deterrence or
more cooperative strategies generate the highest levels of compli-
ance. Yet research framed by such a bi-polar model may not only
be unenlightening, it also may produce misleading results.3 "3
The interactions among norms, enforcement and compliance
are complex; and the research regarding those interactions that
this article proposes will be complex. The challenges range from
the absence of a governing paradigm regarding the existence and
function of norms to the heterogeneity of current environmental
enforcement tools, requirements and targets. At the same time,
there are reasons for optimism, including the availability of more
robust compliance data, the widespread interest in regulatory re-
form, and the growing support for empirical work at the intersec-
tion of law, social science and public policy. Those considerations
suggest that we may be on the verge of a period of explosive growth
in our understanding of the variables that affect compliance with
environmental laws.
This article attempts to facilitate and structure that growth. It
provides a conceptual framework based on the insights from the
legal and social science literature and proposes a testable typology
of eight norms that influence environmental compliance. Even in
its untested form, the framework proposed here suggests that regu-
lators need to understand the relationships among enforcement,
social norms and compliance, regardless of whether their environ-
mental enforcement objective is optimal compliance, full compli-
ance, or over-compliance. At a minimum, regulators should take
affirmative steps to avoid having social norms undercut the deter-
rent .effect of formal legal sanctions. In certain circumstances, it
also may be advisable to seek to trigger or shift social norms to
facilitate the achievement of desired environmental outcomes.3 14
312. For three recent articles on the deterrence versus cooperation debate, see Lof-
ton, supra note 20, at 10,906 (comparing enforcement approaches and environmental val-
ues in the United States and the United Kingdom); Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 1186
(concluding that a strong deterrence focus is essential); and Spence, supra note 13, at 977-
96 (concluding that the rational polluter assumptions that lend support to deterrence-
based enforcement are undercut by research suggesting that cooperation model advocates
arguments regarding the effect of complexity on compliance are right much of the time).
313. See Silberman, supra note 308, at 10,523. The polarization between the models
undercuts attempts to understand the optimal balance of enforcement prescriptions in
other fields as well. See, e.g., AxREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 101-32; Burby & Pater-
son, supra note 244, at 754.
314. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 908 (noting that "[a] regulatory policy that targets
[Vol. 22:55
2003] TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS IN ENVTL. COMPLIANCE 143
Work based on frameworks such as the one proposed here also
may help resolve the more theoretical debates in the legal litera-
ture regarding the influence of internal and external norms. For
example, the hypotheses to be tested in the environmental compli-
ance area can be structured in a way that may not only test the
framework proposed here, but also help resolve a debate in the
norms literature regarding the influence of internal social norms.
Some have concluded that research should focus principally on ex-
ternal norms. In this view, internal norms serve as signals of the
behavioral type of the actor, but these "[n] orms do not cause any-
thing." 1 ' Yet many of the most intriguing examples of departures
from the standard deterrence model in the environmental and
other regulatory compliance literature discussed above appear to
arise from internal, not external, norms. The research on norms
and environmental compliance thus may advance the more gen-
eral debate over internal norms in addition to generating more
effective strategies for environmental enforcement.
Finally, the development of testable frameworks like the one
proposed here may contribute significantly to the maturation of
norms scholarship. Although broad theoretical models are enor-
mously valuable insofar as they provide a disciplined, parsimonious
analytical approach to hypothetical situations, by their nature they
exclude many variables. The empirical studies in the social science
literature suggest that humans respond to various social stimuli,
whether regulatory or extra-regulatory, in ways that are often
counterintuitive. If norms are to improve the predictive capacity of
rational choice theory and assist policymakers, the broad models
proposed in the norms literature will need to be translated into
testable approaches tailored to particular types of compliance be-
havior. The conceptual framework presented in this article, includ-
ing the delineation of specific norms and mechanisms of action of
social norms may well be the cheapest and most effective strategy available to a govern-
ment seeking to discourage risky behavior. It may complement or work more efficiently
than existing regulatory approaches"). The framework suggests that a number of more
specific changes in environmental laws and policies may be warranted. For example, if the
hypotheses proposed in this article are confirmed, enforcement agencies should craft en-
forcement strategies to publicize the human health or environmental harms of violations
to trigger internal and external norm sanctions. Agencies also should seek to change the
types of public disclosures of violations to increase opportunities for informal social sanc-
tions as well as for formal legal sanctions. In particular, agency enforcement actions and
the announcements regarding them should be managed to avoid creating perceptions of
widespread noncompliance.
315. See Posner, supra note 48, at 1788.
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law on those norms, suggests a methodology for developing and
testing the role of norms in environmental compliance decision-
making and other regulatory areas.
The recent growth in empirical legal scholarship has promise,
but it brings with it a related concern: false knowledge. A core les-
son from the history of science is that the growth of knowledge
often is impeded not by ignorance but rather by researchers' reluc-
tance to abandon false ideas.316 How many of our current views
about the effects of law on behavior will prove to have been false
after a generation in which the testing is as rigorous as the theoreti-
cal analyses conducted to date? This article does not suggest that
every proposition of importance can be tested or even that policy-
makers should always wait for answers to those hypotheses that can
be tested. The political process and the exigencies of many envi-
ronmental and other problems will not permit that approach. But
an underlying framework that supports systematic investigation of
the ways in which social norms affect environmental compliance is
one step in that direction, and it may provide a way to address the
swinging pendulum of environmental policy. In the environmental
area, stopping the pendulum, or at least circumscribing its arc,
would be a welcome development indeed.
316. See DANIEL BOORSTIN, CLEOPATRA'S NOSE 7 (1994) (stating that "the great men-
ace to progress is not ignorance but the illusion of knowledge").
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